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ABSTRACT

I develop a theory of personal ontology called normative pragmatic selfhood (NPS) to
explain what persons are and how they are morally valuable. I also demonstrate the applicability
of NPS theory by using it to assess the moral status of marginal cases in bioethical dilemmas. I
begin by discussing the concept of intrinsic value and why it is problematic when it comes to
persons. I then draw upon John Dewey’s theory of value, specifically the concept of growth, and
Kant’s concept of humanity to show that persons are objectively yet extrinsically valuable. Next,
I discuss and argue how the psychological and narrative theories of identity are unable to justify
the value of persons and how NPS theory succeeds in doing so. I conclude by showing how the
application of NPS theory to marginal cases offers one way of thinking through these difficult
bioethical issues.
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1
INTRODUCTION

One issue regarding personhood in ethics is whether persons have dignity and moral
worth, as seen in debates on applied ethics issues such as abortion and euthanasia. Philosophers
often approach these issues by proposing lists of necessary criteria an entity would have to
satisfy to be a person. The question of what a person is becomes especially difficult to answer
when discussing the problem of marginal cases. “Marginal case” is a philosophical term of art
and refers to an entity whose moral status is uncertain or controversial. An entity’s moral status
determines the circumstances under which it is permissible to treat that entity in certain ways,
and the determination is made on the basis of whether the entity possesses a morally relevant
property or set of properties.
Much of the controversy surrounding marginal cases stems from disagreement over
which properties are thought to be morally relevant. While some philosophers, for instance, hold
the morally relevant property to be the capacity to experience pain and pleasure, others hold it to
be the possession of a certain degree of rationality and self-awareness. The most frequently
discussed examples of marginal cases include fetuses, the severely cognitively impaired, and
comatose individuals. Determining which, if any, of these entities are moral patients requires an
account of personhood. Developing such an account is the focus of my dissertation.
I propose and defend a novel conception of personhood that I call normative pragmatic
selfhood (hereafter NPS). NPS theory is a theory of personal ontology which defines a person as
a temporally extended entity capable of forming ends-in-views. NPS theory is grounded in a
pragmatist conception of value that I develop, and it draws primarily on what John Dewey and
Kant say about value. According to NPS theory, the morally relevant property for determining
an entity’s moral status is that the entity is valued as an end-in-itself. If an entity values itself as
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an end-in-itself, then there is what I call an “end duty” against killing that entity or allowing it to
die. I focus on the concept of value because the biomedical issues I discuss include abortion and
euthanasia, and many people argue against these practices by claiming that the value of human
life is intrinsic. I relate NPS theory to the problem of marginal cases to show one approach in
thinking about these types of biomedical issues and how they might be resolved.
My goal in this dissertation is to defend NPS theory. I do not, however, seek to give a
“proof” for my theory in the sense of building my theory up from a set of ground principles. I
instead justify NPS theory by way of establishing a reflective equilibrium. Reflective
equilibrium is a method of justifying a theory by striking a balance, or coherence, among a set of
particular beliefs through a process of mutual adjustment between those beliefs and general
principles. In this dissertation, the set of particular beliefs are verdicts about the permissibility of
certain ethical practices (e.g. abortion, euthanasia, and killing). These beliefs are offset against
points taken from the philosophies of Dewey and Kant. This is why, especially in chapter three,
I often justify claims essential to NPS theory by appealing to claims that these philosophers have
made. One will see that the verdicts I draw about the permissibility of particular cases are
widely accepted, and that my use of reflective equilibrium is therefore appropriate.

3
CHAPTER ONE:
INTRINSIC VALUE

1.0 THE INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC DISTINCTION
I begin this dissertation with a discussion of intrinsic value for two reasons. The first is
that many bioethical debates involving marginal cases often rest on the assumption that the value
of human life is intrinsic. This is particularly true of arguments against abortion and euthanasia,
and one goal of this dissertation is to determine under which, if any, circumstances these
practices are permissible. The second reason is that according to NPS theory the value of
persons is extrinsic, not intrinsic. It would therefore be helpful to explain the underlying
concepts of this claim before discussing the claim itself later in chapter three. I begin by
introducing the concepts of intrinsic value and of value in general. I then set the stage for later
arguing that persons are extrinsically valuable by presenting two arguments showing that the
concept of intrinsic value is problematic.
In some anti-abortion and anti-euthanasia arguments, the assumption that life is
intrinsically valuable is directly acknowledged as a premise. Consider, for example, the
following passage from a newsletter issued by Josh Brahm, a member of the anti-abortion and
anti-euthanasia activist group Georgia Right to Life:
The problem in our culture today lies in that human life once was considered to
have intrinsic value. Now we are being reduced to having instrumental value.
You hear this every time someone argues for assisted suicide to preserve the
“quality of life” of a person. Instead of human beings being valuable in
themselves, the only truly valuable things are experiences or states of living that
human beings can have. For example, making a contribution to society, being
happy, and having a meaningful life are the states of existence that our culture
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views as inherently valuable. This is the type of thinking that naturally leads to
euthanasia.1
In the context of anti-abortion and anti-euthanasia rhetoric, the term “intrinsic value” is
sometimes used interchangeably with the phrase “the sanctity of life.” Leon R. Kass, a
conservative bioethicist, presents a case in point:
What exactly is meant by the sanctity of life? This turns out to be difficult to say.
In the strictest sense, sanctity of life would mean that life is in itself something
holy or sacred, transcendent, set apart – like God himself. Or, again, to begin
with our responses to the sacred, it would mean that life is something before
which we stand (or should stand) with reverence, awe and grave respect – because
it is beyond us and unfathomable. In more modest but also more practical terms,
to regard life as sacred means that it should be protected, defended, and preserved.
Despite their differences, these various formulations agree in this: that
“sacredness”, whatever it is, inheres in life itself, and that life, by its very being,
calls forth an appropriate human response, whether of veneration or restraint. To
say that sacredness is something that can be conferred or ascribed – or removed –
by solely human agreement or decision is to miss the point entirely (original
emphasis).2
Although the concept of “intrinsic value” is frequently used in advancing arguments against
abortion and euthanasia, it is not as straightforward as these arguments suggest. I will show that
both Brahm and Kass’s usage of the concept is in fact confused. With that said, I now discuss
the concept of intrinsic value.
According to Christine Korsgaard, the term intrinsic refers to a way in which something
possesses its value. Intrinsic value is value that is non-relational: if a thing is intrinsically
valuable, then it possesses its value by virtue of the thing’s intrinsic, or non-relational properties.
Shelly Kagan writes that this can be understood to mean that the thing would continue to possess
its value even if it were the only existing thing in the universe:

1

Josh Brahm, The Value of Human Life: Intrinsic, or Instrumental?,
http://www.grtl.org/docs/instrinsicorinstrumental.pdf
2
Leon R. Kass, Life Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (San
Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), 234-235.
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On the one hand, we have the notion that of the value that an object has “in
itself”. Philosophers sometimes try to get at this kind of value by suggesting that
it is the value that an object would have even if it were the only thing existing in
the universe. Although this particular suggestion is not without its own
difficulties, it points us toward the basic idea that value of this sort must depend
solely upon the intrinsic – that is, roughly, nonrelational – properties of the
object.3 4
According to Korsgaard, “intrinsic” is a category that is one half of a distinction pertaining to
how things are valuable. The other half is the category “extrinsic”, and it is the value something
has due to the thing’s relational properties. In addition to the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, there
is a distinction between instrumental goods and final goods. An instrumental good is something
that is valued as a means to an end, while a final good is something that is valued as an end in
itself. So, whereas the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction tracks how things have value, the
instrumental good/final good distinction tracks how things are valued. There are thus two
distinctions in goodness. As Korsgaard describes them,
One is the distinction between things valued for their sakes and things valued for
the sake of something else – between ends and means, or final and instrumental
goods. The other is the distinction between thing which have their value in
themselves and things which derive their value from some other source:
intrinsically good things versus extrinsically good things. Intrinsic and
instrumental good should not be treated as correlatives, because they belong to
two different distinctions.5
In light of this discussion, it is clear that Brahm and Kass are confused about the concept of
intrinsic value. Brahm explicitly contrasts intrinsic value to instrumental value and fails to keep
Korsgaard’s two distinctions separate. Although Kass seems to understand intrinsic value to

3

Shelly Kagan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” in Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, ed. Toni
Rønnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 98.
4
Kagan proceeds in this same paper to reject this conception of intrinsic value. I too reject it for
reasons I discuss much later. I quote him here only to show how intrinsic value has been
traditionally conceptualized.
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mean something that rests on non-relational properties (“Despite their differences, these
formulations agree in this: that ‘sacredness’, whatever it is, inheres in life itself…”)6, he also
takes the concept to mean valuing something for its own sake (“In more modest but also more
practical terms, to regard life as sacred means that it should be protected, defended, and
preserved”).7 Brahm and Kass illustrate that the concept of intrinsic value is sometimes misused.
Intrinsic value pertains to how a thing possesses value, not to how agents value it. Intrinsic value
is value that a thing possesses by virtue of its intrinsic, or non-relational, properties. It is this
concept of intrinsic value that it is problematic, as I will show next.
1.1 INTRINSIC VALUE ACCORDING TO MOORE
By intrinsic value, I mean the conception of intrinsic value to which G.E. Moore was
committed. According to Ben Bradley, this conception is grounded in the following principles:
SUP: “Intrinsic value is a kind of value that when it is possessed by something, it is
possessed by it solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties.”8
ISO: “Intrinsic value is a kind of value such that when had by something, that thing would
continue to have it even if it were alone in the universe.”9
BET: “Adding something with intrinsic value to the world makes the world, or a life, or an
outcome, better (other things being equal).”10
PRO: “When something is intrinsically good, someone has a reason to try to promote it, or
preserve it, or make it true, or bring it into existence.”11
FGE: “The bearers of intrinsic value are fine-grained entities, like states of affairs,
propositions, or facts.”12
6

Christine Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” in Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, ed.
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 78.
7
Kass, Life Liberty and the Defense of Dignity, 234.
8
Ben Bradley, “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9, no. 2
(2006): 112.
9
Ibid., 113.
10
Ibid., 119.
11
Ibid., 120.
12
Ibid., 115.
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Let us briefly examine these principles individually. The intrinsic properties referenced in SUP
are properties that are non-relational. Recall from Kagan that these are the properties a thing
would have if it existed in complete isolation. Thus, since SUP states that a thing’s intrinsic
value is value that the thing possesses by virtue of those properties, an intrinsically valuable
thing would continue to have that value in isolation because it would continue to have those
properties in isolation. SUP, in other words, implies ISO. This is why Bradley writes, “If
something’s intrinsic properties are the properties it has in isolation, then ISO follows from
SUP.”13 Of course, neither Bradley nor Kagan was the first philosopher to conceptualize an
intrinsic property in this way. They are merely reiterating an idea that G. E. Moore developed
over a century ago, the so-called “isolation test” for determining what, if anything, possesses
intrinsic value. According to Moore, that which is intrinsically good is good even if it were to
exist in complete isolation as the only existing thing in the universe. BET states that a world
where something exists that is intrinsically valuable is “better” than a world where that thing
does not exist.
PRO states that if something is intrinsically valuable, then there are reasons to “promote
or preserve” it that stem directly from the fact that the thing possesses intrinsic value. Robert
Audi captures the gist of this idea in the following passage:
The most important single point is that whatever one may consider intrinsically
good or intrinsically bad, one is committed to taking it to provide a reason for
action, specifically, some positive consideration that is normative at least in the
wide sense that it counts toward the rationality of the action in question. For
instance, if we believe that pain is intrinsically bad, we are committed to taking it

13

Bradley, “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,” 113.
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to provide (negative) reasons for action, thus to regarding the fact that doing
something causes pain as a reason to avoid doing it.14
The idea then behind PRO is that the intrinsic value of a thing determines which actions
involving that thing are either permissible or impermissible.
Finally, FGE states that the types of things that are intrinsically valuable are things like
states of affairs, propositions, and facts. As Noah Lemos points out, these things are abstract:
At this point, I wish to turn from consideration of abstract objects such as
properties, facts, and states of affairs and discuss whether certain concrete,
particular things are also bearers of value. The concrete particulars I wish to
consider are individual things such as human beings, dogs, apples, and cars.
These things are not abstract objects; they are not properties, facts, or states of
affairs. I argue that such concrete particulars are not bearers of intrinsic value.15
States of affairs, propositions, and facts are abstract objects, and are therefore to be distinguished
from concrete particulars like dogs, iPhones, and raindrops. Bradley observes that “Versions of
this view have been held by many Mooreans.” 16 It also seems that Moore himself was
committed to FGE. He writes,
I have myself urged…that the mere existence of what is beautiful does appear to
have some intrinsic value; …that such mere existence of what is beautiful has
value, so small as to be negligible, in comparison with that which attaches to the
consciousness of beauty…That it is only for the sake of these things…these
complex wholes themselves, and not any constituent or characteristic of them –
that form the rational ultimate end of human action and the sole criterion of social
progress: these appear to be truths which have been overlooked.17
In other words, intrinsically valuable things are “complex wholes” formed by states of
consciousness and objects of art and beauty. The concept of intrinsic value is thus grounded in

14

Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 130.
15
Noah Lemos, Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant (Cambridge [England]; New York, NY,
USA: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 26.
16
Bradley, “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,” 6.
17
G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 188-189.
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the principles SUP, ISO, BET, PRO, and FGE. The strategy behind my arguments against
intrinsic value is to show how some of these principles conflict.
1.2 PROBLEMS WITH INTRINSC VALUE
One argument against intrinsic value works by showing that ISO and FGE are
incompatible, meaning that they cannot both be true. Recall these two principles:
ISO: “Intrinsic value is a kind of value such that when had by something, that thing
would continue to have it even if it were alone in the universe.”18
FGE: “The bearers of intrinsic value are fine-grained entities, like states of affairs,
propositions, or facts.”19
States of affairs, propositions, and facts are abstract entities. As such, they do not occupy places
in time and space, as do concrete things. The reason ISO and FGE are incompatible is that facts
cannot exist by themselves. As Torbjörn Tännsjö comments, “A fact cannot exist in isolation,
however.”20 In other words, a fact has to be a fact of something, namely a concrete particular.
Noah Lemos articulates this in the following passage:
In general, if someone’s having property F is intrinsically good, it does not follow that
either (1) that person who has F or (2) the property of F itself is intrinsically good. Oh
the other hand it does not seem reasonable to hold that if some concrete, individual A
were intrinsically good, then the fact that A exists would be intrinsically good. (original
emphasis)21
Lemos’s passage also shows that even though abstract entities, unlike concrete ones, do not
occupy places in time and space, it does not follow that they can exist independently of
concretely existing entities. It implies that the fact of a thing’s existence is good only if the thing
itself is good, and that thing exists concretely. Now one might say that there is something that

18

Bradley, “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,” 113.
Ibid., 115.
20
Torbjörn Tännsjö, “A Concrete View of Intrinsic Value,” in Recent Work on Intrinsic Value,
ed. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 209.
21
Lemos, Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant, 27.
19

10
can instantiate the fact of nothingness, and that is nothingness itself. But what is nothingness?
How can nothingness be defined other than the absence of everything? Nothingness
is…nothing! A world with nothing in it is one in which no concrete entities exist. Thus, because
states of affairs, propositions, and facts are cannot exist apart from entities that are concrete, it
follows that they cannot exist in absolute isolation. Therefore, because ISO states that an
intrinsically valuable thing can exist in absolute isolation, and because states of affairs,
propositions, and facts cannot exist by themselves, it follows that ISO and FGE are incompatible.
Lemos advances a criticism that focuses on Moore’s isolation test. Lemos refers to the
idea designated by ISO as ontological isolationism, which he says is problematic because there
are some things that are intrinsically good but cannot exist in absolute isolation. He writes,
This sort of ontological isolationism is not very helpful since there are certain
sorts of things that are intrinsically good but simply could not be the only things
that exist. Consider the fact of Smith’s being happy and let’s suppose that it is
intrinsically good. If there are certain abstract entities such as numbers or
properties or states of affairs that necessarily exist, it would be impossible for
Smith’s being happy to be the only thing that exists. More important, though, is
the fact that Smith’s being happy could not exist without Smith existing…Since it
is necessarily false that Smith’s being happy could be the only existing thing, this
sort of ontological isolationism is not very clear or very helpful.22
Lemos states here that if ontological isolationism is true, and there is something that does possess
intrinsic value, then it would be impossible for certain abstract entities, like numbers, to exist in a
world that contains only a certain state of affairs, like happiness. Lemos also states that if
ontological isolationism is true, then this would seem to exclude certain intrinsically good things
from existing if their existence requires the existence of other things. Lemos’s conclusion
implies that ISO and Moore’s isolation test are flawed methods for identifying things that are
intrinsically valuable.

22

Ibid., 10-11.
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Lemos’s rejection of the isolation test is unjustified. He says that Smith’s being happy is
intrinsically valuable if Smith’s being happy is the only existing thing in the universe. This
formulation of the isolation test is correct. However, Lemos then goes on to reject the isolation
test on the basis that the antecedent (If Smith’s being happy is the only existing thing in the
universe) cannot obtain. Lemos fails to realize that conditional statement is evaluated by
assuming the truth of its antecedent, and that a false antecedent is therefore irrelevant to the
evaluation of a conditional. The isolation test, therefore, cannot be rejected on the basis that
Smith’s being happy is the only existing thing in the universe is a state of affairs that cannot
obtain. Lemos’s argument fails. This does not mean, however, that the test, and Moore’s
conception of intrinsic value more generally, are without problems.
There is the issue of how knowledge of intrinsic value is possible. Moore thinks the only
evidence required for determining whether something possesses intrinsic value is intuition, as he
demonstrates in the following passage:
Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you
can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admire – mountains, rivers, the
sea; trees, and sunsets, stars and moon…And then imagine the ugliest world you
can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing everything
that is most disgusting to us, for whatever reason, and the whole, as far as may be,
without one redeeming feature. The only thing we are not entitled to imagine is
that any human being ever has or ever, by any possibility, can, live in either, can
ever see and enjoy the beauty of the one or hate the foulness of the other. Well,
even so, supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation by human
beings; still, is it irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should
exist than the one which is ugly? Would it not be well, in any case, to do what we
could to produce it rather than the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that it
would; and I hope that some may agree with me in this extreme instance.23
Moore seems to be saying here that one can know which things are intrinsically valuable simply
by relying on one’s intuition. Tara Smith points out a problem with Moore’s reliance on

23

Moore, Principia Ethica, 83-84.
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intuition. She says that different agents can have different intuitions about what is intrinsically
valuable: “If we fail to elicit someone else’s endorsement of the same things as intrinsically
valuable, our only recourse is to look harder. This hardly confirms the independent existence of
non-relational value.”24 To prove Smith’s point, suppose there is a race of intelligent beings that
evolved from a type of dung beetle. These beings possess the same level of rationality as
humans and are therefore able to engage in Moore’s isolation test. Because of their evolutionary
heritage, these beings would think that it is the filthy world, not the world that Moore thinks is
beautiful, that is intrinsically valuable. This illustrates the problem, then, with relying solely on
intuition to determine what is intrinsically valuable.
Moore’s passage about the intrinsic value of beauty points to an interesting observation
about Moore and Bradley. Recall from Bradley that the Moorean conception of value is
committed to the principle of BET, whereby “adding something with intrinsic value to the world
makes the world, or a life, or an outcome, better (other things being equal).”25 Now a world that
is beautiful would make someone’s life in that world better. Moore says that if a life includes the
contemplation of that beauty, then an intrinsically valuable thing like beauty makes a life better.
But when Moore tells us to imagine a world that is beyond contemplation, he is saying that such
a world is one whose beauty is beyond aesthetic appreciation. There is confusion then as to how
a beautiful world can be beneficial to anyone if no one can appreciate it. If Bradley’s BET is
correct in claiming that a beautiful world makes a life better, then such a world would have to
make life better through some way other than that of agents contemplating the world.

24
25

Tara Smith, “Intrinsic Value: Look-Say Ethics,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2006): 544.
Ben Bradley, “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,” 119.
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There is, however, a more serious concern with BET. Recall that the Moorean
conception of intrinsic value is committed to FGE, which states that the bearers of intrinsic value
are like states of affairs. Moore refers to these states of affairs as complex wholes in the
following passage, which I have repeated here from earlier in section 1.1:
I have myself urged…that the mere existence of what is beautiful does appear to
have some intrinsic value; …that such mere existence of what is beautiful has
value, so small as to be negligible, in comparison with that which attaches to the
consciousness of beauty…That it is only for the sake of these things…these
complex wholes themselves, and not any constituent or characteristic of them –
that form the rational ultimate end of human action and the sole criterion of social
progress: these appear to be truths which have been overlooked.26
As I noted in section 1.1, an intrinsically valuable object is a complex whole formed by states of
consciousness and objects of art and beauty. For Moore, a complex whole is the sum of (a) the
value of a state of consciousness, (b) the value of an object of consciousness, and (c) the value of
what he calls the organic unity of (a) and (b).27 Moore refers to the organic unity by the
expression “as a whole” and the complex whole by the expression “on a whole” when he writes,
…the value which a thing possesses on the whole may be said to be equivalent to
the sum of the value which it possesses as a whole, together with the intrinsic
values which may belong to any of its parts (original emphasis).28
Accordingly, as Thomas Hurka explains,
A whole’s intrinsic value as a whole is its intrinsic value just as a combination of
parts and independently of any values in those parts. Its intrinsic value on the
whole is its intrinsic value on balance or all things considered, that is, the value
that results from adding its intrinsic value as a whole to any values in its parts.29

26

G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 188-189.
For Moore’s discussion on the relationship between organic unities and complex wholes, see
pp. 27-31 of Principia Ethica.
28
Ibid., 214.
29
Thomas Hurka, “Two Kinds of Organic Unity,” The Journal of Ethics 2, no.4 (1998): 301.
27
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Hurka here says that a thing’s intrinsic value on the whole is the value a thing has, all things
considered. This is consistent with Moore’s position that all final value is intrinsic value, and
this in turn is consistent with his claim that it is only for the sake of complex wholes that “the
rational ultimate end of human action”30 is formed. What this implies is that these complex
wholes are the bearers of intrinsic value that are subject to the isolation test. They are also the
things to which Bradley refers to in BET, which states that “Adding something with intrinsic
value to the world makes the world, or a life, or an outcome, better (other things equal).”31 A
more stringent statement of BET is that if something x has intrinsic value, and if x is added to the
world, then that world would be better than one to which x was not added. We have seen that
Moore thinks that the bearer of an intrinsic value is a complex whole. It is a sum of the value of
an organic unity and the value of each of the unity’s parts. It is important to realize that Moore
thought that the value of an organic unity is not the sum of the value of each of the unity’s parts,
as noted by his principle of organic unity: “The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the
same as the sum of its parts.”32 The principle allows for the value of an organic unity to be
greater than the value of each of the unity’s parts. Suppose then that there is a complex whole
consisting in part of someone’s taking pleasure in torturing others. This complex whole would
be the sum of the value of someone’s pleasure, the value of someone else’s being tortured, and
the value of an organic unity of someone’s pleasure and someone else’s being tortured. Suppose
that the value of the organic unity is sufficiently large so as to assign a positive value to the
complex whole of which the unity is a part. This would make the complex whole intrinsically
good. If so, it would follow from BET that this complex whole would make the world better.

30

Moore, Principia Ethica, 189.
Bradley, “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,” 119.
32
Moore, Principia Ethica, 28.
31
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This, however, is problematic because it suggests that a world in which someone is tortured is
better than one in which that person is not tortured. This result is implausible and points to a
conflict between Bradley’s BET and Moore’s conception of intrinsic value.
A similar concern can be seen with ISO and Moore’s isolation test in that there is the
potential for identifying intrinsically valuable states of affairs that are not unconditionally good.
Dariel Dall’Agnol writes about pleasure as one such example:
Can we consider, for instance, Peter experiencing pleasure good in isolation?
Apparently, this is a good state of affairs, but it may happen in circumstances
which it cannot be said that it is unconditionally good. Suppose that Peter is a
pirate killing an innocent and enjoying it. It seems clear that the isolation test can
lead to an error of evaluation if it is applied in this radical or absolute way.33
That ISO carries with it the potential for identifying intrinsically valuable states of affairs that are
not unconditionally valuable presents a problem to Moore’s isolation test because Moore thinks
that all intrinsic value is final value.
1.3 RECAP
In this chapter, I discussed the concept of intrinsic value as conceived by Moore and the
difficulties surrounding Bradley’s principles. This lays the foundation for NPS theory to argue
that persons are extrinsically valuable. However, since NPS theory relies heavily on the moral
philosophy of John Dewey, the American pragmatist philosopher, I will first provide an
overview of Dewey’s theory of value. That is the purpose of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO:
DEWEY’S THEORY OF VALUE

2.0 INSTRUMENTALISM
Dewey’s thoughts about the nature of value are complex and difficult to explain in a
linear fashion, leading James Gouinlock, a noted Dewey scholar, to comment, “To enter upon an
analysis of Dewey’s philosophy of value is certainly one of the most formidable tasks one can
undertake in connection with his thought.”34 Much of the difficulty, however, is removed once
we recognize what Dewey thought the proper goal of ethical theory should be. Traditional
ethical theory aims at the formulation of principles that aim at the identification of right actions
and morally valuable ends, but Dewey eschews this goal in favor of something else. According
to Elizabeth Anderson, “Dewey’s ethics replaces the goal of identifying an ultimate end or
supreme ethical principle with the goal of identifying a method for improving our value
judgments.”35 This point is echoed by Robert E. Dewey36, who states,
[In a similar way], Dewey rejects the assumption that it is the task of ethics to find
some ultimate and supreme moral standard. Empirically, every moral situation is
unique. To hope that a single moral law might anticipate and provide guidance
for every moral case is to overlook the variety, the changes, and the individuality
which characterize actual moral situations. Instead of a single, oral standard,
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there are many moral rules. These rules are generalizations embodying the past
experience of men in solving their problems.37
Dewey thought that in a world as messy and complicated as ours, the assumption that a handful
of principles is sufficient to guide an agent to right action in any given situation was too naïve to
grant. Moral principles, insisted Dewey, do not carry the justificatory weight that philosophers
such as Kant and Mill think they do.38 This affinity to particularism will become clearer after
discussing Dewey’s ideas on the nature of value judgments. As it will be seen, Dewey thinks the
task of moral theory is to resolve problematic situations. As he puts it,
Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what is right and
what is wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflection…For what is called
moral theory is but a more conscious and systematic raising of the question which
occupies the mind of any one who in the face of moral conflict and doubt seeks a
way out through reflection.39
To grasp what this conception of moral theory entails, one must first examine Dewey’s thoughts
on the logic of value judgments. He rejects the idea that the truth content of a value judgment is
determined on the basis of whether the judgement corresponds to an existing state of affairs.
One cornerstone of his philosophy is that value judgements are not primarily descriptive. He
does not think, in other words, that the statement “X is good” endeavors primarily to describe
something, X, as possessing the property of goodness. So what does Dewey think value
judgments are if they are not primarily descriptive? The answer is suggested by his commitment
to what RE Dewey calls the instrumentalist theory of knowledge which, though long, is so apt
that it deserves to be given in full:
According to this view [the instrumentalist theory of knowledge], knowledge is
not embodied in ideas descriptive of a reality which exists antecedently to, and
37

Robert E. Dewey, The philosophy of John Dewey: A Critical Exposition of His Method,
Metaphysics, and Theory of Knowledge (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 11-12.
38
Much later, however, I will point out some striking similarities between Dewey and Kant.
39
John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston., 1908), 5.

18
independent of, the knowing subject. To the contrary, the activities of both
thinking and knowing occur when an organism experiences conflict within a
specific situation. Thus occasioned, these activities function to resolve the
conflict by seeking ways of reorganizing the situation to re-establish an (sic)
harmonious interaction of the organism and its environment. Put in other terms,
both thinking and knowing have the practical aim of solving problems concerning
what ought to be done. Conceived in this way, ideas are essentially plans of
action functioning as instruments for the achievement of better practice.
Accordingly, the test of their worth is their actual success as instruments in
bringing about a future solution of the problem which occasioned reflection at the
beginning. The test is not the faithfulness of the ideas in recording some real
world as it is, was or shall be. Ideas are instruments, not mirrors; and their
worth [i.e., their truth or value as knowledge] is to be judged as one judges the
worth of any instrument by use in practice. (my emphasis)40
Conceptualizing knowledge instrumentally thus involves understanding beliefs as tools that
agents use when they encounter problematic situations. According to a non-instrumentalist
theory of knowledge41, the main function of value judgments is to help agents secure knowledge
of the world outside of themselves. This is not to suggest that, according to non-instrumentalist
theories of knowledge, value judgments have no bearing on justifying actions. Rather, it is to
think that value judgments, despite their function of enabling agents to perform actions, are not
themselves judgments about what to do. The underlying assumption behind non-instrumentalist
theories of knowledge is that practical judgments and theoretical judgments are two distinct
categories of belief, and that value judgments fall squarely within the latter. Although Dewey
concedes that value judgments have a descriptive form, this does not detract from his claim that
value judgments are essentially tools that we as agents use to guide our conduct and manage our
practical engagement with the world when problematic situations arise. As Dewey himself
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declares, “My theme is that a judgment of value is simply a case of practical judgment, a
judgment about the doing of something.”42 Anderson notes,
Value judgments are tools for enabling the satisfactory redirection of conduct
when habit no longer suffices to direct it. As tools, they can be evaluated
instrumentally, in terms of their success in guiding conduct. We test our value
judgments by putting them into practice and seeing whether the results are
satisfactory — whether they solve the problems they were designed to solve,
whether we find their consequences acceptable, whether they enable successful
responses to novel problems, whether living in accordance with alternative value
judgments yields more satisfactory results.43
In other words, Anderson says that Dewey regards value judgments essentially as tools the agent
uses to render their situation unproblematic and resume their activity or conduct.
Dewey’s instrumentalist understanding of value judgments stems from what may be
called his instrumentalist view understanding of human beings. According to Dewey, human
beings are essentially practical. They are constantly engaged in practical activity:
In truth man acts anyway, he can’t help acting. In every fundamental sense it is
false that a man requires a motive to make him do something. To a healthy man
inaction is the greatest of woes. Anyone who observes children know that while
periods of rest are natural, laziness is an acquired vice – or virtue. While a man is
awake he will do something, if only to build castles in the air.44
To claim that human beings are essentially practical is to say that they are first and foremost
problem-solving entities. RE Dewey writes,
According to Dewey, man is first and foremost a future-oriented, problem-solving
animal whose characteristics and activities evolved from, but remain continuous
with, processes taking place on the so-called lower levels of life. Like other
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organisms, man is concerned to find a satisfactory adjustment to the
environment.45
It follows from Dewey’s view of human beings as fundamentally active, problem-solving,
practically engaged creatures that the concepts required for the formation of value judgments
function as tools for action. RE Dewey continues,
Man’s moral life is simply one aspect of man’s life as a problem-solving animal.
When the interactions of men with their environment are proceeding smoothly,
questions do not arise concerning what they ought to do. It is only when trouble
develops in a specific situation that men are led to ask what they should do.
Moral ideals then arise to function as projected plans of action which might solve
the particular difficulty confronted.46
So the instrumentalist nature of value judgments is due to the instrumentalist, practical
orientation nature of human beings. Value judgments are practical because activity provides the
impetus for them. It is only because agents are practically engaged with the world around them
(i.e., that they are engaged in activities), that it becomes possible to formulate goals or ends in
the first place. Dewey writes, “There is no inquiry which does not involve judgments of
practice”47, to which Todd Lekan remarks, “We do not make value judgments in a vacuum.
Norm-users are always already participating in a variety of activities and practices that embody
and promote a variety of goods.”48 Our nature as active creatures ensures that all our thoughts
function as tools used to achieve the ends of our actions. People tend to assume that purposeful
activity consists of first deciding upon a goal (an end) and then deciding upon a course of action
(the means) in order to achieve it. For example, it is only after Susan has decided to become a
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doctor that she must then decide how to become one. This includes achieving high test exam
scores, graduating from medical school, and completing a term of residency. This model of
purposeful activity is built on the assumption that the ends are formed apart or independently
from the means, and it is precisely due to this assumption that Dewey rejects the model.
According to him, the ends of action are not formed apart from the means of action. Instead,
Ends arise and function within action. They are not, as current theories too often
imply, things lying beyond activity at which that latter is directed. They are not
strictly speaking ends or termini of action at all. They are terminals of
deliberation, and so turning point inactivity.49
In other words, what an agent designates as the end of their activity is really just the point when
their old activity becomes redirected into a new one. Activity does not cease just because its
designated end has been reached. Once again, this is because human beings, by virtue of the sort
of creatures they are, are continuously engaged in activity. There is no vantage point from which
agents disengage themselves from what they are doing in order to formulate the ends of their
actions. Because we cannot help but be constantly engaged in action, says Dewey, our ends
must be formed and evaluated in medias res. We form ends-in-view when whatever action we
happen to be engaged in is set back by a problematic situation, and the ends-in-view are
evaluated on the basis of how efficiently they serve to eliminate that problem.50 This raises
questions about what Dewey thought about the nature of value.
To those who understand value theory as essentially a branch of metaphysics that Moore
kick started in the early the twentieth century, it might seem that Dewey approaches the topic of
value more from the standpoint of a psychologist than a philosopher, in that much of his work on
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value focuses on how people form value judgments, rather than clarifying the nature of value.
But if it seems that what Dewey has to say about the nature of value is perfunctory, it may be due
to the fact that Dewey’s views don’t fit neatly within any of the traditions of the most familiar
debates in twentieth century metaethics. Jennifer Welchman demonstrates the difficulty in trying
to pigeonhole Dewey’s metaethical views:
Dewey, like Hume, was an ethical naturalist who believed that moral phenomena
are natural phenomena. But unlike Hume and his twentieth-century successors,
such as the emotivists Charles L. Stevenson and A.J. Ayer, Dewey was not a noncognitivist. He did not accept the view that moral claims such as “Her character
is exemplary” or “His conduct was vicious” are pseudo-propositions that express
speakers; subjective attitudes or tastes rather than verifiable assertions about their
own or others’ conduct or character. Consequently, he also rejected the view that
values, unlike facts, are neither responsive to reason nor empirically verifiable.51
And as she continues,
In contrast, Dewey holds that value judgments, moral and non-moral, make
assertions about things, acts, and persons that can be true or false in a pragmatic
sense. But unlike many cognitivist naturalists, Dewey does not take his
naturalism to entail moral realism: the position that there are specifically “moral”
facts, properties, or relations to which moral propositions and principles refer.52
This difficulty of categorization also applies more specifically to Dewey’s thoughts about the
nature of value. As Gouinlock notes below, Dewey was neither an objectivist nor a subjectivist
about value as those terms are usually understood:
Value is neither an isolated entity, nor a phantom of subjective mind, nor a
transcendent form; But it is an eventual function in nature, produced with the
contrivance of intelligence and activity … that function of experience and nature
which Dewey designates by the term “value” is the consummatory phase of a
situation, which is initially problematic.53
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So unlike Moore, Dewey rejects the idea that value itself (i.e. “goodness”) is a mind-independent
entity, but at the same time he also rejects the idea that value is subjective, that what is good is
defined simply as what one values to be good. For Dewey, value is a function of value
judgments, which he regards as primarily practical judgements about how to act. What this
means is that for Dewey, values do not exist antecedently to but through the formation of value
judgments. He writes,
A practical judgment has been defined as a judgment of what to do, or what is to
be done: a judgment respecting the future termination of an incomplete and in so
far indeterminate situation. To say that judgments of value fall within this field is
to say two things: one, that the judgment of value is never complete in itself, but
always in behalf of determining what is to be done; the other, that judgments of
value (as distinct from the direct experience of something as good) imply that
value is not anything previously given, but is something to be given by future
action. (my emphasis)54
And also,
It does follow…that valuation is not simply a recognition of the force or
efficiency of a means with respect to continuing a process. For unless there is a
question about its continuation, about its termination, valuation will not occur.
And there is no question save where activity is hesitant in direction because of
conflict within it… I do not believe that valuations occur and values are brought
into being save in a continuing situation where things have potency for carrying
forward processes. (original emphasis)55
Philosophers have traditionally assumed that values exist prior or antecedent to the formulation
of value judgments. Dewey’s rejection of this assumption is clear in these two passages: ideas
are not first and foremost descriptions of reality but are tools that effectuate changes in the
agent’s practical standpoint. Values do not exist prior to valuations. Values rather come to exist
only through the formation of valuations. An understanding of how Dewey thought this works
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begins by examining the distinction he draws between valuing something and judging something
to be valuable.
2.1 ESTEEMING/PRIZING AND ESTIMATING/APPRAISING
Dewey often refers to valuing something as esteeming or “prizing.” Judging something
to be valuable is called estimating or “appraising.” These processes are to be understood as
separate and distinct from each other:
There is a difference which must be noted between valuations as judgment (which
involves thought in placing the thing judged in its relations and bearings) and
valuing as a direct emotional and practical act. There is a difference between
esteem and estimation, between prizing and appraising. To esteem is to prize,
hold dear, admire, approve; to estimate is to measure in intellectual fashion. One
is direct, spontaneous; the other is reflex, reflective.56
In contrasting the spontaneous character of esteeming/prizing with the reflective character of
estimating/appraising, we are to think that esteeming/prizing is then non-reflective. This is, in
fact, exactly how Dewey wants esteeming/prizing to be understood:
The distinction between direct valuing, in the sense of prizing and being absorbed
in an object or person, and valuation as reflective judgment, based upon
consideration of a comprehensive scheme, has an important bearing upon the
controversy as to the intuitive character of moral judgments. Our immediate
responses of approval and reprobation may well be termed intuitive. They are not
based upon any thought-out reason or ground.57
As seen here, Dewey frequently uses the term “immediate” to capture the spontaneous character
of esteeming/prizing, hence his comments that “Value as such, even things having value, cannot
in their immediate existence be reflected upon; they either are or are not; are or are not
enjoyed”58 and “Values are values, things immediately having certain intrinsic qualities. Of
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them as value accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are.”59 The idea that immediate
value (the object of one’s esteeming/prizing) possesses intrinsic qualities that make value
unanalyzable may sound similar to Moore, who famously argued that goodness is a primitive
concept. The differences between Dewey and Moore cannot be starker though. Not only was
Dewey an ethical naturalist, as was mentioned earlier, he also took immediate value to be devoid
of normative content, saying, “Taken in and of themselves, intuitions or immediate feeling of
what is good and bead are of psychological rather than moral import”.60 What is immediately
valuable is the object what one happens to be esteeming/prizing, which consists of liking or
approving something on the basis of immediate experience instead of reflective judgment. The
absence of reflection means objects are esteemed/prized as they are immediately experienced.
There is no opportunity to reflect upon objects before they are esteemed/prized, and what an
agent esteems/prizes is therefore not necessarily something that they should value at all. But
there is more to esteeming/prizing than simply having a set of pre-reflective attitudes. It is also
accompanied by action. According to Dewey,
Even when I speak of a direct experience of a good or bad, one is only too likely
to read in traits characterizing a thing which is found in consequence of thinking
to be good; one has to use language simply to stimulate a recourse to a direct
experiencing in which language is not depended upon. If one is willing to make
such an imaginative excursion – no one can be compelled – he will note that
finding (original emphasis) a thing good apart from reflective judgment means
simply treating the thing in a certain way, hanging on to it, dwelling upon it,
welcoming it and acting to perpetuate its presence, taking delight in it. It is a way
of behaving toward it, a mode of organic reaction. (my emphasis)61
In other words, to esteem/prize a thing is to make a behavioral display of approving or liking it
solely on the basis of its being immediately experienced. Dewey makes no distinction between
59
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valuing something and acting as if that something is valuable. An object of immediate value is
ipso facto something to which the valuer is disposed to act or behave in a certain manner.
Anderson writes that one way of interpreting Dewey’s idea of esteeming/prizing something is to
perform actions that are driven largely by impulse and habit:
At the most primitive level, valuings are tendencies to move toward, acquire, or
ingest certain things, or, on the negative side, to avoid, reject, spew out other
things. One need not have any idea of what one is valuing in order to value it. In
the first instance, then, valuings simply denote impulses toward or away from
objects, as when an infant turns toward human voices, or swats away a fly.
Valuings of objects as useful can also be immediate – that is, not mediated by
cognition or awareness of what one is doing. One simply uses a fork to pick up
food, without thinking about it. Habits, then, are also a species of valuing.62
Anderson here describes valuing as a behavioral disposition. Her understanding of Dewey’s idea
of esteeming/prizing is shared by other Dewey scholars like Scott R. Stroud, who says about
immediate value,
Such a value is shown when one takes delight in something directly, as when one
hears a favorite song or reads a poem that accords with his or her preferences.
One does not need to establish that such things are good or valued; they just are
valued or experienced as good. After the fact one may label the enjoyment or
prizing a “value”, but that does not motivate the actual experience of the object or
situation in question. Take an individual who walks about on the street and
avoids mud puddles. Dewey would say that even though the individual has not
gone through an elaborate and reflective process justifying such behavior, the
person immediately acts as if he or she valued staying dry. (original emphasis)63
Stroud’s last sentence suggests, again, the point that there is more involved in esteeming/prizing
a thing than simply liking or approving it. To esteem/prize something is to act toward it.
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Recapping then, the picture is as follows: Dewey recognizes a difference between
valuing something and judging something to be valuable. He calls the object of the former
“immediate value” and refers to the act of valuing by the terms “esteeming” and “prizing”. The
agent esteems/prizes a thing by liking or approving it. Moreover, the agent does not
esteem/prize a thing because they feel like approving it after having thought about what it is.
They esteem/prize a thing because approval is the first impulse they have when they experience
it. Accordingly, because there is no conscious thought involved about in esteeming/valuing a
thing, it does not involve judging it as something that is worth valuing or as something that
should be valued. This is what makes esteeming/prizing non-normative. Although
esteeming/prizing is pre-reflective, the agent must esteem/prize in order to estimate/appraise.
Estimating/appraising is defined as the process whereby the agent forms valuations, and this is
why Dewey considers it to be reflective, unlike esteeming/prizing. Understanding how this
works requires taking a closer look at the valuations themselves.
2.2 VALUATIONS
Recall that according to the instrumentalist theory of knowledge, ideas do not endeavor to
describe antecedently existing states of affairs. They are instead primarily practical judgments
that an agent makes about which action to perform. Accordingly, the truth content of a valuation
is determined by the consequences that actually follow from performing the designated action.
As Anna Putnam puts it,
Dewey holds that any factual proposition that is made the basis of an inference
becomes thereby a hypothetical proposition: that is, open to verification or
falsification by the occurrence or non-occurrence of the consequences it predicts.
Dewey concludes, that, therefore, the truth or falsehood of a practical judgment is
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constituted by the outcome of intelligent action in accordance with it. In other
words, for judgments of practice truth is verification.64
Anderson makes the same point by comparing valuations to scientific hypotheses:
It is uncontroversial that instrumental judgments are subject to empirical testing
and confirmation, since they involve empirical claims about causation. We test
scientific hypotheses by bringing about their antecedents and seeing if the results
are as they predicted. Similarly, we test value judgments by acting on them and
seeing if we value the consequences in the way the judgment predicted. Acting on
our value judgments — putting them into practice — supplies the data for
confirming or disconfirming them. Roughly speaking, a value judgment
hypothesizes “try it, you’ll like it” — a statement easily subject to empirical
verification and refutation.65
Despite the fact that a valuation has a descriptive form (e.g., x is good), an initially formed
valuation is not a value judgment that is true or false. This is because a judgment of any kind is
either true or false; what makes a valuation true or false depends on what happens after the agent
successfully executes the action suggested by his valuation. In other words, the valuation does
not become a value judgment that is true or false until the end of the valuation is realized.
Accordingly, until the agent who has formed a valuation actually executes the corresponding
action, the valuation is neither true nor false. As Dewey himself says,
The bearing of this remark upon the nature of the truth of practical judgments
[including the judgment of what is given] is obvious. Their truth or falsity is
constituted by the issue. The determination of end-means [constituting the terms
and relations of the practical proposition] is hypothetical until the course of action
indicated has been tried. The event or issue of such action is the truth or falsity of
the judgment.66
This raises the question, then, as to what happens upon the execution of an action that determines
whether the corresponding valuation is either true or false. Answering this question requires
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examining what exactly Dewey thinks the subject term of a valuation is. In other words, what is
the agent describing as good when he makes a valuation.
For Dewey, the subject term of a valuation is what he calls the “end-in-view.” The endin-view is what the agent describes as good when he makes a valuation. It is whatever the x may
be in “x is good”. An end-in-view is an outcome that the agent projects as the goal of a plan of
action. Dewey writes,
Behavior has ends in the sense of results which put an end to that particular
activity, while an end-in-view arises when a particular consequence is foreseen
and being foreseen is consciously adopted by desire and deliberately made the
directive purpose of action.67
Dewey is saying here that the end-in-view is a not yet existing state of affairs that the agent
wants to exist and that he predicts will, in fact, exist if he executes a certain action. The basis on
which the agent forms an end-in-view is the set of circumstances that make up their present
practical standpoint: they form an end-in-view only when they become enveloped in a
problematic situation, i.e., when something has happened that is preventing them from
continuing to engage in a current activity. The end-in-view is what the agent proposes to
themselves as a solution to the problem. Accordingly, if there is no problem, then there is no
occasion for the agent to form an end-in-view:
When we inquire into the actual emergence of desire and its object and the valueproperty ascribed to the latter [instead of merely manipulating dialectically the
general concept of desire], it is plain as anything can be that desires arise only
when “there is something the matter,” when there is some “trouble” in an existing
situation. When analyzed, this “something the matter” is found to spring from the
fact that there is something lacking, wanting, in the existing situation as it stands,
an absence which produces conflict in the elements that do exist. When things are
going completely smoothly, desires do not arise, and there is no occasion to
project ends-in-view, for “going smoothly” signifies that there is no need for
effort and struggle. It suffices to let things take their “natural” course. There is
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no occasion to investigate what it would be better to have happen in the future,
and hence no projection of an end-object.68
Gouinlock gives an example of how this works:
Suppose a cook is happily engaged in the preparation of a stew. He runs out of
salt. Thus there is a problematic situation, and he has to find a way to resume his
activities. In this case, his end-in-view would be to acquire in some way some
salt. Possession of the salt would not itself be a value, but it is a necessary
condition for creating a value – creating a reunified situation.69
The message of these two passages is clear: the agent forms an end-in-view only when they
encounter a problematic situation, which Dewey understands as a set of circumstances that is
preventing the agent from continuing to engage in activity. Since the end-in-view is the object of
a valuation and is defined as the idea of an end of an action that the agent believes will resolve
the problem at hand, it follows that the end-in-view is an idea that does not refer to anything that
presently exists. This clarifies Dewey’s belief that an initially formed valuation is not a
judgement that is either true or false. It is neither true nor false because the subject term of the
valuation is a representation of something that is brought into existence through future action and
is therefore something that does not exist when the valuation was initially formed. As Dewey
illustrates,
When a man is ill and after deliberation concludes that it be well to see a doctor,
the doctor doubtless exists antecedently. But it is not the doctor who is judged to
be the good of the situation, but the seeing of the doctor: a thing which, by
description, exists only because of an act dependent on a judgment. Nor is the
health the man antecedently possessed (or which somebody has) the thing which
he judges to be a value; the thing judged to be a value is the restoring of health –
something by description not yet existing. The results flowing from his past
health will doubtless influence him in reaching his judgment that it will be a good
to have restored health, but they do not constitute the good which forms the
subject-matter and object of his judgment. He may judge that they were good
without judging that they are now good, for to be judged now good means to be
68
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judged to be the object of a course of action still to be undertaken (original
emphasis).70
Thus, since values do not exist apart from ends that the agent has in view, and these ends do not
exist at the time when he makes a valuation, it follows that the values themselves do not exist at
the time when the agent makes a valuation. They result from achieving future ends of future
action. Dewey give another example: “The end-in-view of the man who sees an automobile
approaching him is getting to a place of safety, not safety itself.” (original emphasis)71 This
illustrates the fact that the end-in-view is not an object, but a situation consisting of the agent
who made the valuation and the agent’s environment. Gouinlock confirms this:
It would be seriously misleading to regard the end-in-view as an object in itself.
Rather, it is a particular way of interacting with selected features of the
environment. End-in-view, then, as a purpose or aim, is a proposed interaction in
which both the agent and his surroundings would be necessarily and intimately
involved. (my emphasis)72
It is important to note that ends-in-view are not the same as the actual ends themselves. The
actual end does not exist when the agent makes a valuation. The end-in-view, however, does
exist when the valuation is made because making a valuation is the act whereby an end-in-view
is formed. Ends-in-view and the actual ends that the ends-in-view describe are separate. As
Dewey explains,
The end-in-view of desire is that object which were it present would link into an
organized whole activities which are now partial and competing. It is no more
like the actual end of desire or the resulting state attained, than the coupling of
cars which have been separated is like an ongoing single train. Yet the train
cannot go without the coupling.73
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Just as a train cannot exist without the coupling of cars, the end of an action cannot exist if the
agent does not have an idea of that end, that is, if he does not have an end-in-view. An end-inview is no more the end of an action than an individual train car is a train.
So far we have discussed three main components of Dewey’s theory of value: the
valuation, the end-in-view, and the end of an action. A valuation is a value judgment that is true
or false only if the agent realizes his end-in-view. An end-in-view is the object of valuation and
is an idea or representation of the end of an action that the agent desires to achieve. The end of
an action is the actual consequence of the action represented by the agent’s end-in-view, which
means it does not exist until the agent completes that action. It is by completing the action
represented by the agent’s end-in-view that value is either created or not, and their valuation is
made either true or false. This brings us finally to the topic of what Dewey thinks values are in
themselves.
2.3 VALUE IN ITSELF
The term “value in itself” is highly suggestive of ethical non-naturalism in general and
Moore in particular. Recall that Moore distinguishes between things that are good and goodness
itself, and he held that the latter exists independently of any entity that falls into the category of
the former. Dewey rejects this picture in its entirety. Referring to the earlier illustration of the
cook preparing a stew, Gouinlock said acquiring salt is the cook’s end-in-view and the
possession of the salt is the end of the action. The possession of the salt is not the value itself
that is created. Gouinlock instead refers to a reunified situation as the moment when the agent’s
problematic situation is eliminated by the achievement of the end that was represented by his
end-in-view. This reunified situation exemplifies what Dewey commonly calls a consummatory
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situation which Gouinlock earlier referred to as a “function of experience and nature.”74 And as
Dewey himself writes,
Being true, beautiful, or good, is recognized as a common character of subjectmatters in spite of great differences in their actual constituents. They have,
however, no meaning save as they indicate that certain subject-matters are
outstanding consummatory completions of certain types of previously
indeterminate situations by means of the execution of appropriate operations.75
So Dewey’s term for value in itself is consummatory situation, which refers not to the agent’s
realization of his end-in-view, but to a certain effect caused by the realization of that end. The
consummatory situation is the situation in which the agent, upon realizing the end that was
represented by his end-in-view, has his problematic situation resolved. This puts the roles of
esteeming/prizing and estimating/appraising into focus.
As noted earlier, esteeming/prizing is impulsive and non-reflective. In contrast,
estimating/appraising is reflective because it is the act of making a valuation. An agent
estimates/appraises only when they encounter a problematic situation. Until then, they feel no
need to consciously think that what they are doing is good, and so they do not estimate/appraise.
Dewey makes this point with the following example:
Now if anybody will condescend to a concrete experience he will perceive how
often a man eats without thinking…An onlooker or anyone who reflects is
justified in saying that he acts as if he judged the material to be food. He is not
justified in saying that any judgment or intellectual determination has entered in.
He has acted; he has behaved toward something as food: that is only to say that he
has put it in his mouth and swallowed it instead of spewing it forth. The object
may then be called food. But this does not mean either that it is food (namely,
digestible and nourishing material) or that the eater judged it to be food and so
formed a proposition which is true or false. The proposition would arise only in
case he is in some doubt, or if he reflects that in spite of his immediate attitude of
aversion the thing is wholesome and his system needs recuperation, etc. Or later,
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if the man is ill, a physician may inquire what he ate, and pronounce that
something not food at all, but poison. (original emphasis)76
Although we typically know that what we eat is food, we usually eat it without consciously
thinking of the fact that it is food. Most of the time, eating is a non-conscious activity. This
exemplifies esteeming/prizing. Most of the time we value things without thinking about valuing.
Sometimes, however, we do stop and to think about what we are eating, such as when we
discover after taking a bite of something that it tastes bad. It is during such moments of
discontent when we are interrupted that we look to do what we think will restore the equilibrium
that was lost (e.g. by eating something else or taking medicine), and this involves making
provisionary judgments (what is food and what isn’t) so that we can inform ourselves as to what
course of action should be taken. We make provisionary judgments regarding what is valuable
only when something causes us to cease valuing.
It is important to note that the end-in-view is only the end that the agent thinks will
resume their state of esteeming/prizing. Whether it actually does resume upon achieving the end
is by no means guaranteed. It is entirely possible that, upon achieving the end of their end-inview, the agent’s state of esteeming/prizing will not resume. Dewey writes,
Value may be ascribed or imputed, just as a particular substance may be taken
into the system for food. And the ascription or imputation may in both cases
consist in a manner of behavior, of treatment, rather than in any reasoned-out
process. But since the existence of value depends upon the outcome – the
fulfilling or institution of a determinate change of relationship – the thing may not
after all be a value. (original emphasis)77
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In the instance that the agent’s state of esteeming/prizing does not resume, the agent does not
value the end of their end-in-view, value is not created, and the agent does not end up accepting
the corresponding valuation as true.
Putting it together then, Dewey thinks any given thing is made valuable by acting on the
belief that it is valuable. This belief is called a valuation, and it is formed through the process
called estimating/appraising. The agent estimates/appraises only when something prevents them
from continuing to esteem/prize, that is, when they encounter a problematic situation. In
estimating/appraising, the agent forms an idea of an action whose end the agent thinks will
restore their state of esteeming/prizing. This idea is called the end-in-view, and it is the subject
term of the agent’s valuation. The agent then acts upon their end-in-view; they strive to realize
the end their end-in-view describes. If, upon realizing that end, the agent’s state of
esteeming/appraising fails to resume, then a consummatory situation is not created, and the
agent’s valuation is made into a false value judgment. If their state of esteeming/prizing does, in
fact, resume upon achieving the end described by the end-in-view, then a consummatory
situation is created, and the agent’s valuation is made into a true value judgment.
2.4 OBJECTIVE VALUE
Dewey is an objectivist about value. He thinks there is at least one thing in the world that
is good regardless of whether it is thought to be good. Raising this point is important because
I’ve said that Dewey claims valuations create values by denoting ends that agents desire to
pursue, and this might easily lead to the conclusion that Dewey is a subjectivist who defines the
good in terms of what is desired. The following passage reveals that although Dewey thinks
desire is essential to value, he is not a subjectivist:
It is true, of course, that it would be foolish to set up anything as the end of desire,
or as desirable, which is not actually desired or capable of being desired. But it
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would be equally stupid to assume that what should be desired can be determined
by a mere examination of what men do desire, until a critical examination of the
reasonableness of things desired has taken place. So there is a distinction
between the enjoyed and the enjoyable. (original emphasis)78
What Dewey means here is that it is only by understanding how a situation is problematic that an
agent can form the end-in-view most suitable for resolving that situation. The agent’s situation
reflects features of their surrounding environment and is therefore mind-independent. Thus,
because a consummatory situation arises from the resolution of a situation that is constituted by
mind-independent features of reality, the consummatory situation itself is mind-independent as
well, and this explains why Dewey an objectivist about value. Accordingly, the task of deciding
which outcome will serve as one’s end-in-view is accomplished by examining one’s outward
surroundings:
An end, aim, or purpose as a mental state is independent of the biological and
physical means by which it can be realized. The want, lack, or privation which
exists wherever there is desire is then interpreted as a mere state of “mind” instead
of as something lacking or absent in the situation – something that must be
supplied if the empirical situation is to be complete. In its latter sense, the needful
or required is that which is existentially necessary if an end-in-view is to be
brought into actual existence. What is needed cannot in this case be told by
examination of a state of mind but only by examination of actual conditions.
(original emphasis)79
So Dewey is not a subjectivist about value because consummatory situations are resolutions of
situations that are mind-independent, and this makes consummatory situations mind-independent
as well.
Although Dewey thinks values originate from the interactions agents have with a mindindependent reality whenever they pursue ends, this does not answer the question as to what he
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thought were the ends that agents should pursue. What are the values, in other words, that
Dewey holds to be objectively good?
In contrast to certain philosophical traditions such as natural law theory, Dewey does not
identify what should be valued with what has absolute value, or what is always valuable
regardless of context. Indeed, he rejects the idea of absolute value as incoherent. He writes,
The business of reflection in determining the true good cannot be done once for
all, as, for instance, making out a table of values arranged in a hierarchical order
of higher and lower. It needs to be done, and done over and over and over again,
in terms of the conditions of concrete situations as they arise. In short, the need
for reflection and insight is perpetually recurring.80
A thing’s value, in other words, is always contextual to the problematic situation at hand. This
point is also expressed in the following passage where Dewey writes,
If the need and deficiencies of a specific situation indicate improvement of health
as the end and good, then for that situation health is the ultimate and supreme
good. It is no means to something else. It is a final and intrinsic value.81
Since Dewey thinks consummatory situations are contextual to problematic situations, the
content of an agent’s value judgment may change. This point is clarified by comparing
valuations to scientific hypotheses. Recall Anderson’s earlier comment that value judgments are
tested by acting on them and then confirming or discarding them after examining the
consequences. Science, of course, cannot be practiced without forming and testing hypotheses.
A hypothesis may be accurately described as a provisional truth. It is a prediction that the
scientist treats it as if it were true so that they can decide which experiments to conduct and how
to go about conducting them. If even after repeated attempts the results of their experiments do
not match their predictions perfectly, in which case their hypothesis would be re-classified as a
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theory, they are still required to continue treating the judgment as a provisional truth. This is
because no matter how firmly established a scientific theory may be, it is always subject to
possible revision in the light of newly discovered evidence. For Dewey, valuations work
according to the same logic. A valuation is a prediction that becomes a true value judgment only
when acting upon the valuation and realizing its end-in-view produces the result that was
predicted by the agent who performs the action. And since the agent will always encounter new
situations and challenges as they go through life, there will always be opportunities for them to
revise those valuations that have become value judgments. Hence Dewey’s comment:
In quality, the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself. It is new every
morning, fresh every evening. For it marks the resolution of a distinctive
complication of competing habits and impulses which can never repeat itself.82
This is one way in which Dewey expresses the point that any value judgement the agent makes is
eligible for revision. Just as new evidence may falsify a theory and require the scientist to revise
judgments they accepted true in the past, new experiences may prove that what was valuable to
an agent in the past may no longer be valuable in the present. Thus, any true value judgment an
agent accepts as true is only true provisionally. Since valuations are made to resolve problematic
situations, and new problematic situations may not be resolved by valuations that were accepted
as true in the past, any valuation that was previously transformed into a true value judgment may
later become false. There is thus no such thing as a “final end” in the sense of an end that is
always good regardless of context and which an agent should always strive to achieve no matter
the cost. As Dewey says,
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Ends are, in fact, literally endless, forever coming into existence as new activities
occasion new consequences. "Endless ends" is a way of saying that there are no
ends—that is no fixed self-enclosed finalities.83
And also,
In reference to those ends which are the consummatory events in nature, it is
likewise true, of course, that they too are at the same time both endings and
beginnings. More concretely, whenever and end is achieved, this condition does
not mark the completion or termination of all activity. It is, of course,
intrinsically valuable; but it is also transitional to further endeavors and
consummations.84

2.5 THE VALUE OF GROWTH
Although Dewey rejects the idea of final ends as goods that warrant the termination of all
action, he does hold that there is one end that is final in the sense that all agents should pursue it
as an end-in-itself. He repeatedly refers to this end in his writings by the term “growth”, as seen
in the passage below, for example,
… the process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the static
outcome and result, becomes the significant thing. Not health as an end fixed
once and for all, but the needed improvement in health – a continual process – is
the end and good. The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the
active process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final
goal, but ever-enduing process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in
living. Honesty, industry, temperance, justice, like health, wealth and learning,
are not goods to be possessed as they would be if they expressed fixed ends to be
attained. They are directions of change in the quality of experience. Growth
itself is the only moral end.85
Thus there is room in Dewey’s theory of value for at least one final end: growth. The concept of
growth is one of the most important in Dewey’s philosophy. Although he does not explicitly
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define the concept of growth, several key features are easily discernable from his writings.
Consider the following passage for instance:
Except as the outcome of arrested development, there is no such thing as a fixed,
ready-made, finished self. Every living self causes acts and is itself caused in
return by what it does. All voluntary action is a remaking of self, since it creates
new desires, instigates to new modes of endeavor, brings to light new conditions
which institute new ends. Our personal identity is found in the thread of
continuous development which binds together these changes. In the strictest
sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and becoming for
the better or the worse. It is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set
up this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself. To make an end a
final goal is but to arrest growth. Many a person gets morally discouraged
because he has not attained the object upon which he set his resolution, but in fact
his moral status is determined by his movement in that direction, not by his
possession. (original emphasis).86
In any context, the term “growth” signifies a change in something that exists, whether it be trees
or fortunes. A helpful analogy is the growth of a tree. A tree becomes bigger and taller when its
roots absorb nutrients from the soil and its leaves catch the rain and sunlight required for
photosynthesis. Because of its surrounding environment the tree develops into a flourishing
specimen. Likewise, the growing agent is the agent who undergoes changes that result from
maintaining a certain relationship with their environment. Dewey writes,
Human nature exists and operates in an environment. And it is not “in” that
environment as coins are in a box, but as a plant is in the sunlight and soil. It is of
them, continuous with their energies, dependent upon their support, capable of
increase only as it utilizes them…87
So, as with trees, agents are also inextricably intertwined with their surroundings, and this makes
growth possible. Unlike trees though, the kind of growth Dewey has in mind for agents is not
biological:
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The growing, enlarging, liberated self, on the other hand, goes forth to meet new
demands and occasions, and readapts and remakes itself in the process. It
welcomes untried situations…Indeed, we may say that the good person is
precisely the one who is most conscious of the alternative, and is the most
concerned to find openings for the newly forming or growing self; since no matter
how “good” he has been, he becomes “bad” (even though acting upon a relatively
high plane of attainment) as soon as he fails to respond to the demand for growth.
Any other basis for judging the moral status of the self is conventional. In reality,
direction of movement, not the plane of attainment and rest, determines moral
quality. (my emphasis)88
It is implied here that agents grow by responding to their problematic situations. The relevant
sense of growth pertains not to biology, but to practical reasoning and morality. Gouinlock also
describes the Deweyan concept of growth:
This notion of growth can be given a more concrete sense by consideration of the
nature of the self. The self is not a substance; it is a dynamic organization of
habits, which are demands for certain kinds of activity. The self, in other words,
is a set of functions with the environment. Thus when the self “grows”, it is not
like a balloon swelling with air. It is, rather, that the structure of habits –
functional cooperations of organism and environment – becomes more extensive
and more meaningful and it fulfills more diverse and effectual functions in
behavior; and at the same time human energies find fuller and more effective
engagement with their surroundings.89
The point made by these passages is that an agent grows by striving to overcome problematic
situations to re-establish their mode of valuing/prizing. The activities of pursuing and realizing
ends-in-view constitute the process by which this is done. The agent grows when they realize an
end-in-view, and the realization of ends-in-view is the definition of growth. If, for whatever
reason, the agent does not realize the end-in-view they have formed, then they do not undergo
growth, and they are not acting in accordance with their nature as a problem solver. As RE
Dewey puts it, “Whatever else may be involved in growth, the growing self is an experimenter –
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a person who observes new situations, tries new lines of conduct, and readjusts himself on the
basis of what he learns.”90 Growth occurs only upon the realization of an end-in-view. With that
said, does Dewey believe that in order for an agent to grow their realization of an end-in-view
must produce a consummatory situation? In other words, if an agent’s situation remains
problematic upon realizing an end-in-view, does the agent fail to grow? The answer to this
question is no. Dewey believes that growth occurs irrespective of what happens upon the
realization of an end-in-view. Even if the situation remains problematic and fails to be
consummatory, the agent grows because they have realized an end-in-view. Remember Dewey’s
comment that making an end a final goal arrests growth, but movement toward that direction is
growth. Although not every realization of an end-in-view will produce a consummatory
situation, no consummatory situation can be produced without the realization of an end-in-view.
Dewey equates growth with movement – the agent who realizes an end-in-view is “moving in
the direction” of a consummatory situation and is thereby growing. In short, upon realizing an
end-in-view the agent can experience growth even when their situation fails to become
consummatory. This is because, says Dewey, the experience of failing to restore the mode of
valuing/prizing upon realizing a particular end-in-view can teach an agent to form different endsin-view that are more efficient:
Since desire and valuation of objects proposed as ends are inherently connected,
and since desire and ends-in-view need to be appraised as means to ends (an
appraisal made on the basis of warranted physical generalizations) the valuation
of ends-in-view is tested by consequences that actually ensue. It is verified to the
degree in which there is agreement upon results. Failure to agree, in case
deviations are carefully observed, is not mere failure but provides the means for
improving the formation of later desires and ends-in-view. (my emphasis)91
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And also,
Mistakes are no longer either mere unavoidable accidents to be mourned or moral
sins to be expiated and forgiven. They are lessons in wrong methods of using
intelligence and instructions as to a better course in the future. They are
indications of the need of revision, development, readjustment. Ends grow,
standards of judgment are improved.92
Thus, the agent grows even when their situation fails to become consummatory because they
learn from their mistakes to form alternative ends-in-view. On the flip side, Dewey says growth
can fail to occur even if a situation does become consummatory. This happens when the agent
refuses to revise a past valuation even though new experiences require that they do so:
Positive attainment, actual enrichment of meaning and powers opens new vistas
and sets new tasks, creates new aims and stimulates new efforts. The facts are not
such as to yield unthinking optimism and consolation; for they render it
impossible to rest upon attained goods. New struggles and failures are
inevitable.93
In summary, growth occurs irrespective of what happens upon the realization of an end-in-view.
If a consummatory situation is produced, growth occurs. If the agent’s situation remains
problematic, growth still occurs. All that matters for the occurrence of growth is that realization
itself occurs, for consummatory situations can be produced only through realizations.
2.6 THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS
I argue in this section that happiness is not the value of growth. This is contrary to
Dewey’s view that the agent should value growth as an end in itself because undergoing growth
involves experiencing happiness: “If such a person would set his thought and desire upon the
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process of evolution instead of upon some ulterior goal, he would find a new freedom and
happiness (original emphasis).94
Before proceeding to my argument, however, we need to examine what Dewey means by
happiness. For Dewey, it is the freedom from uncertainty. This happiness is not to be found
exclusively in the realization of any particular end-in-view because, as one recalls, Dewey thinks
that the continuous encountering of new difficulties and problems means that ends are transient;
what an agent accepted as good in the past may be rejected as bad in the future. It would be
ludicrous then for an agent to invest their happiness on the attainment of something that may
later cease to be meaningful to them. Dewey expresses this point below:
What is agreeable at one time disagrees at another…there is something accidental
in the merely agreeable or gratifying. They happen to us…Happiness, on the
contrary, is a stable condition, because it is dependent not upon what happens to
us but upon the standing disposition of the self. One may find happiness in the
midst of annoyances; be contented and cheerful in spite of a succession of
disagreeable experiences… Happiness is a matter of the disposition we actively
bring with us to meet situations, the qualities of mind and heart with which we
greet and interpret situations. Even so it is not directly an end of desire and effort,
in the sense of an end-in-view purposely sought for, but is rather an end-product,
a necessary accompaniment… (original emphasis)95
Dewey points out here that not only should an agent avoid thinking that happiness is something
to be found exclusively in the realization of any particular end-in-view, the agent should avoid
treating happiness itself as an end-in-view to pursue. This is because, in addition to being
transient, ends-in-view are also uncertain. They are outcomes an agent predicts will happen
upon completing an action, and because the agent cannot predict the future with complete
certainty, the future is simply outside of the agent’s control:
Control of the future is indeed precious in exact proportion to its difficulty, its
moderate degree of attainability. Anything that actually tends to make that
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control less than it now is would be a movement backward into sloth and
triviality. But there is a difference between future improvement as a result and as
a direct aim. To make it an aim is to throw away the surest means of attaining it,
namely attention to the full use of present resources in the present situation.96
According to this passage, the surest way of attaining happiness is not to treat it as an aim or endin-view, but to focus one’s attention on the present problematic situation. Dewey writes,
The amount of control which will come into existence in the future is not within
control. But such an amount as turns out to be practicable accrues only in
consequence of the best possible management of present means and obstacles.
(original emphasis)97
The final message is that the agent cannot be happy worrying about what the future may have in
store because future events are ultimately out of the agent’s control. It would be self-defeating to
set growth as an end-in-view because no end-in-view is certain to be realized. To do so would
be stunt growth and perpetuate the very anxiety that one seeks to avoid.
All of this points to the fact that, in order to experience happiness, there is a proper way
for one to pursue growth as an end in itself. Pursuing growth as an end in itself, says Dewey,
involves turning away from the future and focusing on the situation at hand: “To reach an end
we must take our mind off from it and attend to the act which is next to be performed. We must
make that the end.” (original emphasis)98 Pursuing growth as an end in itself involves
recognizing that one’s ends-in-view are means to current action. Remember from Gouinlock’s
cook illustration that the cook would not have made having salt his end-in-view, indeed would
not have bothered to form any end-in-view at all, if his preparation of the stew unfolded
smoothly and according to plan. It is only because it didn’t that the cook formed an end-in-view
on the basis of what he thought would be the course of action most likely to resolve his problem
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and restore his activity. Thus, since an agent makes a valuation only if they are currently facing
a problem, it follows that the object of that valuation (the end-in-view) functions as a means for
changing a current situation, even though the end-in-view is a projection that relates to an end
that does not exist at the time of the problem. This makes an end-in-view a future means to
present action. Dewey elaborates:
Forecast of future conditions, scientific study of past and present in order that the
forecast may be intelligent, are indeed necessities. Concentration of intellectual
concern upon the future, solicitude for scope and precision of estimate
characteristic of any well conducted affair, naturally give the impression that their
animating purpose is control of the future. But thought about future happenings is
the only way we can judge the present; it is the only way to appraise its
significance. Without such projection, there can be no projects, no plans for
administering present energies, overcoming present obstacles. Deliberately to
subordinate the present to the future is to subject the comparatively secure to the
precarious, exchange resources for liabilities, surrender what is under control to
what is, relatively, incapable of control. (my emphasis)99
This passage begins with the assertion that ends-in-view are projections of future ends that must
be recognized as such in order to fulfill their function as means to present action. But Dewey
then goes on to say that in recognizing ends-in-view as projections, the agent often mistakes
ends-in-view as ends to which present action is a mere means. In other words, the agent
frequently and erroneously switches the roles of ends-in-view and present action: instead of
serving as the means, the end-in-view is treated as the end, and instead of serving as the end,
present action is treated as the means. Dewey concludes by stating that when this happens, the
agent ends up treating their present standpoint exclusively as a means to whatever may happen in
the future. Since the agent is unable to predict the future with a degree of certainty that leaves
them feeling completely reassured, they instead feel precarious. Pursuing growth as an end-in-
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itself and experiencing happiness involves concentrating on the present moment and treating
one’s ends-in-view as a means to present action. It does not involve treating happiness itself as
an end-in-view, for to do so would be to forfeit happiness.
The pursuit of growth as a moral end has been understood here as the task of working
toward the resolution of present problems. This understanding of what it means to pursue
growth as a moral end is consistent with the point, raised earlier, that an agent will grow as long
as they realize their ends-in-view even if their situation fails to become consummatory as a result
of doing so. If this point was false and the experience of a consummatory situation was required
for the agent to grow, then pursuing growth as a moral end would amount to the agent worrying
whether their situation will in fact become consummatory. They would then not gain the sort of
happiness supposedly gained by pursuing growth as a moral end, i.e., the happiness of ceasing to
worry that they have little control over future events. In short, the fact that growth occurs
regardless of the outcome that follows from realizing an end-in-view explains why the pursuit of
growth as a moral end should be understood as the process of working toward the resolution of
present problems. If growth were to depend on the production of a certain outcome (i.e. a
consummatory situation), the agent would then focus on producing that outcome instead of the
problematic situation already at hand. They would be led to regard present action as the means
to achieving their end-in-view instead of vice-versa, fail to grow, and therefore squander their
best chance at securing happiness.
To recap the discussion so far, growth has been defined as the realization of ends-inview, and it occurs regardless of the outcome that follows from realizing an end-in-view.
According to Dewey, happiness, in the sense of ceasing to worry about controlling future events,
is acquired by pursuing growth as an end-in-itself, and accounts for why growth should be
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pursued as such. What follows is an argument showing that growth, contrary to Dewey’s claim,
is not objectively good because it produces happiness. It shows that there are, in fact, instances
where growth can result in great sorrow.
Suppose Jack is in a loving relationship with his wife, Ada. The happiness he
experiences from their relationship leaves no doubt in his mind that the relationship is good, and
he is uncompelled to stand back and consciously judge whether it is good or not. Now suppose
Ada is suddenly stricken with a fatal disease, and Jack becomes afraid that he might lose her. It is
on this occasion that he reflects about what their relationship has meant to him, and he judges
that it is worth trying to save. To this end, Jack thinks about how he can help his wife regain her
health. He invests a considerable amount of time and financial resources consulting doctors and
researching treatment options. Unfortunately, it is to no avail, as Ada eventually succumbs to
her illness. Jack feels his life has been irreparably destroyed. He is convinced he will never
again experience the level of emotional fulfillment that Ada provided. I believe Dewey would
say that Ada’s death does not make Jack’s life cease to have moral value even though Ada’s
death marks the failure of Jack’s esteeming/prizing to resume. Let us re-examine the scenario
using the terms and concepts that have been covered thus far.
Jack was esteeming/prizing his relationship with Ada before she became ill.
Esteeming/prizing, as one recalls, is pre-cognitive. To esteem/prize is not to make a valuation.
Valuations are made by estimating/appraising in order to consciously form a judgment (a
valuation) in the effort to restore one’s mode of esteeming/prizing. When Ada became ill Jack
began to reflect on their relationship, and became consciously aware of just how closely
connected his happiness was to her health, and this made him afraid that he could lose her. Jack
thus entered into a problematic situation. His esteeming/prizing ceased and he began
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estimating/appraising. He proceeded to act upon this valuation by forming various ends-in-view
he thinks will save Ada, and thus their relationship. These ends-in-view include medical
consultation and researching different treatment options. Reaching these ends-in-view means
that Jack will actually consult doctors and research treatment options. Reaching these ends-inview successfully means that Ada will recover her health, the relationship will be reestablished,
and Jack’s mode of esteeming/prizing will resume. However, since Ada died, Jack’s mode of
esteeming/prizing failed to resume. His situation remained problematic and failed to become
consummatory. This points to a problem with Dewey’s theory of value.
Since Jack obviously does not experience happiness by realizing his ends-in-view, it
would follow that growth cannot be justified as a moral end on the grounds that pursuing it leads
the agent to happiness. If growth is a moral end, then it is a moral end for a different reason.
The reason is that without growth, the agent would not have the capacity to make valuations, and
this capacity is something that the agent values because they are an agent. The argument for this
claim parallels Immanuel Kant’s argument for the intrinsic worth of rational agency in book two
of his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. This is the topic of the next chapter.
2.7. ENDS-IN-VIEW AND THE CAPACITY FOR GROWTH
There is one more thing I need to discuss before I conclude my exposition of Dewey’s
theory of value. It is important to note that, according to Dewey, an agent is able to form endsin-view only if it is possible for that agent to undergo growth.
Dewey says that desires, like ends-in-view, arise only in the context of facing a
problematic situation:
When we inquire into the actual emergence of desire and its object and the valueproperty ascribed to the latter (instead of merely manipulating dialectically the
general concept of desire), it is plain as anything can be that desires arise only
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when “there is something the matter,” when there is some “trouble” in an existing
situation. When analyzed, this “something the matter” is found to spring from the
fact that there is something lacking, wanting, in the existing situation as it stands,
an absence which produces conflict in the elements that do exist. When things are
going completely smoothly, desires do not arise, and there is no occasion to
project ends-in-view, for “going smoothly” signifies that there is no need for
effort and struggle.100
The term “effort” in the last sentence is significant because it indicates how the agent has a
desire. According to Dewey, to have a desire is to expend effort:
Effort, instead of being something that comes after desire, is seen to be of the very
essence of the tension involved in desire. For the latter, instead of being merely
personal, is an active relation of the organism to the environment [as is obvious in
the case of hunger], a factor that makes the difference between genuine desire and
mere wish and fantasy.101
So if an agent believes that a certain end will resolve a problem but they do not act to realize the
end, then that end is not the object of a desire. The idea they have of the end is not an end-inview, but a mere wish instead. Although a person may not currently be forming ends-in-view,
they still possess the capacity to form ends-in-view. I will return to discuss the capacity to form
ends-in-view in chapter five. The expenditure of effort is not the only condition that must be
satisfied for the agent to acquire the capacity for forming ends-in-view. As Dewey explains
below, the agent’s problematic situation must also be resolvable:
Because valuations in the sense of prizing and caring for occur only when it is
necessary to bring something into existence which is lacking, or to conserve in
existence something which is menaced by outside conditions, valuation involves
desiring (original emphasis). The latter is to be distinguished from mere wishing
in the sense in which wishes occur in the absence of effort. “If wishes were
horses, beggars would ride.” There is something lacking, and it would be
gratifying if it were present, but there is either no energy expended to being what
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is absent into existence or else, under the given conditions, no expenditure of
effort would bring it into existence…(my emphasis)102
If no amount of effort can resolve the agent’s problem, then the problem cannot be resolved, and
the agent’s idea that a certain end might resolve their problem is a wish instead of an end-inview. Thus, according to Dewey, an agent is able to form ends-in-view only if it is possible for
that agent to undergo growth. The importance of this point will become apparent in the next
chapter and more so in chapter five.
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CHAPTER THREE:
NPS THEORY AND THE MORAL VALUE OF PERSONS

3.0 PRELIMINARY REMARKS
The previous chapter established the conceptual background required for understanding
NPS theory. This chapter marks the beginning of discussing NPS theory itself. There is both a
descriptive part and a prescriptive part to the theory. NPS theory is descriptive because it
endeavors to construct a personal ontology. That is, it seeks to describe at the metaphysical level
what persons are. I focus on this part later in chapter four. Chapter three focuses on the
prescriptive part of NPS theory. It is prescriptive because it advances a conception of moral
value, explains how persons possess this value, and uncovers the normative implications that
follow from their possession of it.
I show that the prescriptive force of NPS theory is derived from a combination of
theoretical moves present in Dewey and Kant’s theories of value. Much of the discussion in this
chapter revolves around the humanity-as-an-end formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative.
According to NPS theory, the Deweyan concept of growth shares several roles with the Kantian
concept of humanity, including accounting for the moral value of persons, justifying duties
against killing persons, and enabling persons to engage in practical reasoning. NPS theory
recognizes, however, that these concepts are not identical. In contrast to Kant, NPS theory holds
that the value of persons is not intrinsic, but extrinsic.
I begin the chapter with an explanation of Kant’s formula of humanity, identifying the
meanings of the terms “end-in-itself” and “humanity”. I will then explain why, according to
NPS theory, the value of growth is extrinsic and objective by drawing on Korsgaard’s discussion
of intrinsic value. Next, I show that the extrinsic and objective value of growth implies that the
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value of persons is also extrinsic and objective. Finally, I will show how NPS theory justifies
duties against suicide and the killing of others.
3.1 KANT AND THE VALUE OF HUMANITY
One of Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative is the formula of humanity
(FH), which is stated as follows:
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your person or in any other
person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.103
Although FH states that humanity should be treated as an end-in-itself, it is far from obvious as
to what this is supposed to mean. What does it mean, for instance, to treat something as an endin-itself? And what does Kant mean by “humanity”? FH needs to be thoroughly unpacked, and
I will begin by first explaining what an end is. I then discuss what an end-in-itself is and what
Kant means by the term “humanity.”
For Kant, an end is the goal of an action and constitutes the reason why an action is
performed:
An end is an object of free choice, the representation of which determines it to an
action (by which the object is brought about). Every action, therefore, has its
end…104
Allen Wood expands on this statement by writing that an end is what prompts an individual
agent to act, and that to set an end is at the same time to form a value judgment:
In the broadest sense, however, an end is anything for the sake of which we act (or
refrain from acting). Or, what I think amounts to the same thing, an end is that
whose value provides an (at least relative) terminus in a chain of reasons for an
action. This fits the usual case of an object or end to be affected, since when we
build a house, our building activities are done for the sake of bringing the house
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into being, and the house’s value to us is the reason why we build. (original
emphasis)105
So the end an agent sets for themselves accounts for their choice to act, and the value of the
action is derived from the value they place on the end. I choose to build a house because the end
of building a house is valuable to me. Wood’s illustration is an example of a conditionally
valuable end. That is, it is an example of an end the agent sets for themselves to achieve only if
they want to achieve it. If the agent does not want to achieve it, then they do not set it up as an
end to be achieved, and they do not strive to achieve it. If I do not want to build a house, then I
do not set for myself the end of building one, and I do not engage in the activity of house
building. Conditionally valuable ends are contrasted with ends that are unconditionally valuable.
According to Korsgaard, an unconditionally good thing is a thing that is always good. She calls
this sort of thing an “end-in-itself”:
A thing is unconditionally good if it is good under any and all conditions, it is
good no matter what the context. In order to be unconditionally good, a thing
must obviously carry its own value with it – have goodness in itself (be an end in
itself).106
So an unconditionally good thing, an end-in-itself, is a thing that is always good under all
circumstances. Being an end-in-itself means more than just this, however. In addition to being
unconditionally good, an end-in-itself is an end that confers value on all other ends. Korsgaard
notes, “…something that is unconditionally good and so can serves as a sufficient condition of
their goodness.”107 David Cummiskey also explains this idea, writing that an end-in-itself is the ,
“unconditioned condition” of all value:
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An end-in-itself is an end whose value is not conditioned by anything else; it is a
self-sufficient end that provides the unconditioned condition of the value of all
other ends. (original emphasis)108
An end-in-itself, in other words, is an end that is always good and confers its goodness to all
other good ends as well. Korsgaard refers to unconditional value and conditional value as
intrinsic value and extrinsic value, respectively, and she says that a conditionally valuable end is
an end that is good only sometimes:
If unconditional value is intrinsic value, conditional value is extrinsic value. Now
a thing is conditionally valuable if it is good only when certain conditions are met;
if it is good sometimes and not others.109
Recall from chapter one that Korsgaard uses the term intrinsic to refer to the way in which
something possesses its value, and intrinsic value is value that is non-relational. If a thing is
intrinsically valuable, then it possesses its value by virtue of the thing’s intrinsic, or nonrelational properties.
The question arises as to what the unconditional good, or end-in-itself, is that confers
value on all other ends. Following Kant, Korsgaard says it is humanity, as I will now discuss.
“Humanity”, as Kant uses the term, does not refer to the species Homo sapiens. By “humanity”,
Kant means the capacity an agent has to set ends for themselves to achieve. If I can set ends for
myself to achieve, then I possess humanity. It is evident in Kant’s writings that this is what he
means by “humanity”. He writes, for instance, that “The capacity to set oneself an end – any end
whatsoever – is what characterizes humanity.”110 and also:
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A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from
his animality (quoad actum), more and more toward humanity, by which he alone
is capable of setting himself ends. (original emphasis)111
Humanity, according to Kant, is something that human beings can possess. It refers to a being’s
capacity to set ends for itself to achieve. But does Kant think all human beings possess this
capacity? The answer is no. Kant holds that it is possessed only by beings that are rational.
Thomas E. Hill writes that humanity, in the Kantian sense, is interchangeable with “rational
nature”:
Kant says both that persons are end in themselves and that humanity in persons is
an end in itself. What he calls humanity is ‘rational nature’, or perhaps the
rational nature of human beings. (original emphasis)112
Expanding on an earlier quote from Korsgaard, we see that she confirms the idea that humanity,
or the ability to set ends, is equivalent to rationality:
In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be
something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition
of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of
inclination, for those have only a conditional worth…It cannot be the inclinations
themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it
be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the
unconditionally valuable thing must be “humanity” or “rational nature,” which
he defines as the capacity to set an end. (my emphasis)113
So “humanity” is Kant’s term for an agent’s capacity to create ends, and this capacity is limited
to rational beings, whom he refers to as “persons”:
Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature still have only a
relative value as means and are therefore called things, if they lack reason.
Rational beings, on the other hand, are called persons because, their nature
already marks them out as ends in themselves – that is, as something which ought
not to be used merely as a means – and consequently imposes restrictions on all
choice making (and is an object of respect). Persons, therefore, are not merely
subjective ends whose existence as an effect of our actions has a value for us.
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They are objective ends – that is, things whose existence is in itself an end, and
indeed an end such that no other end can be substituted for it, no end to which
they should serve merely as a means. (original emphasis)114
Kant here says that because persons possess the rational capacity to set ends for themselves,
persons are therefore objectively valuable. This points to Kant’s conclusion that all persons are
valuable as ends-in-themselves: because humanity is valuable as an end-in-itself, and a person is
defined as a being that possesses humanity, it follows that all persons are valuable as ends-inthemselves and should therefore be treated as such. As Kant puts it:
If, then, there is supposed to be a supreme practical principle, and in regard to the
human will a categorical imperative, then it must be such from the representation
of that which, being necessarily an end for everyone, because it is an end in itself,
constitutes an objective principle of the will, hence can serve as a universal
practical law. The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as end in
itself. The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way thus
to that extent it is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational
being also represents his existence in this way as consequent on the same rational
ground as is valid for me;(my emphasis) thus it is at the same time an objective
principle, from which, as a supreme practical ground, all laws of the will must be
able to be derived. The practical imperative will thus be the following: Act so that
you use humanity as much in your own person as in the person of every other,
always at the same time as end and never merely as means. (original emphasis)115
Kant, in other words, holds that persons are intrinsically valuable because humanity is
intrinsically valuable, and a person is defined as a being that possesses humanity. But why does
Kant think humanity is intrinsically valuable? The intrinsic value of humanity is tied to its role
in practical agency, that is, to the agent’s ability to reason about how to achieve the ends they
have set for themselves to achieve. As Andrews Reath writes,
An end in itself is a necessary end that limits all subjective or relative ends. But
an end can be necessary only if it is internally related to practical reasoning – if it
is an end that one has or values simply in so far as one engages in practical
114
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reasoning. The obvious candidate for such an end is rational nature: in so far as
one engages in practical reasoning, one in some way values that capacity…116
The idea here is that since humanity is the capacity to set ends, one cannot set an end without
presupposing that capacity as good. Put another way, since the possession of humanity is a
necessary condition for valuing any given end, it follows that a person must value humanity as
an end-in-itself in order for them to value anything at all. Humanity is thus the one end that is
valuable to every person, and this is why Kant says that humanity is intrinsically valuable, or
valuable as an end-in-itself. This in turn implies duties to treat all persons as ends-in-themselves.
As Reath puts it,
On one standard reading, it amounts to the claim that a commitment to valuing
persons as rational agents is built into the nature of practical reasoning. In so far
as one responds to reasons and to what one takes to be of value or sets ends for
oneself, one values one’s rational capacities, which are capacities essential to
one’s person. Moreover, one values these capacities on general grounds that
commit one to valuing them wherever they are found. That is to say that one is
committed to valuing persons as rational agents.117
To summarize, Kant holds that humanity is the capacity to form ends and that humanity is
unconditionally valuable. Further, every agent must value humanity as an end-in-itself in order
to value anything else or to set any end at all. For Kant, this implies that it is wrong to kill any
agent, including yourself. Suicide is one instance. In the following passage, Kant sees suicide to
be morally impermissible because he understands the act as something that involves treating
oneself as a mere means:
First, as regards the concept of necessary duty to oneself, the man how
contemplates suicide will ask himself whether his action could be compatible with
the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he damages himself in order to escape
from a painful situation, he is making use of a person merely as a means to
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maintain a tolerable state of affairs till the end of his life. But a human being is
not a thing – not something to be used merely as a means: he must always in all
his actions be regarded as an end in himself. Hence I cannot dispose of a human
being in my own person, by maiming, corrupting, or killing him. (original
emphasis)118
The impermissibility of suicide, for Kant, is grounded in the possession of humanity. Humanity
is intrinsically valuable since every person who sets ends for himself must value humanity,
which is the capacity to set any end whatsoever. Suicide is impermissible because achieving
your own death as an end you set for yourself means you aimed at destroying something you also
valued as an end in itself: your own humanity. Kant says this is wrong because endeavoring to
destroy oneself is endeavoring to destroy morality as far as one is able, and morality is itself
intrinsically valuable:
To annihilate the subject of morality in one’s own person is to root out the
existence of morality itself from the world, as far as one can, even though
morality is an end in itself. Consequently, disposing of oneself as a mere means
to some discretionary end is debasing humanity in one’s person (homo
noumenon), to which man (homo phaenomenon) was nevertheless entrusted for
preservation. (original emphasis)119
The next section is a discussion of NPS theory that will show that suicide is prohibited for
similar reasons.
3.2. NPS THEORY – VALUING GROWTH AS AN END-IN-ITSELF
The role of growth in NPS theory is similar to that of humanity plays in Kant’s theory of
value. I noted earlier that Kant holds that humanity functions to enable agents to engage in
practical reasoning by serving as their capacity to form ends. The same function is assigned to
growth in NPS theory. In section 2.7, I showed how Dewey holds that the idea an agent has of
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an end is an end-in-view only if the agent’s problematic situation is resolvable. If it is not
resolvable, then it is not possible for the agent to undergo growth, and the agent cannot form
ends-in-view. The function of growth then is to enable agents to engage in practical reasoning
by affording them the ability to develop ends-in-view.
The ability to engage in practical reasoning does not represent the only conceptual
similarity between humanity and growth. Previously I discussed that for Kant, all agents are
committed to valuing humanity as an end-in-itself, and that this serves as a foundation for
justifying the formula of humanity. The goal of this section is to reveal a similar dynamic behind
the Deweyan concept of growth. Subsequent sections will show how this provides the
foundation for justifying duties against inhibiting the growth of any agent that possesses the
capacity to form ends-in-view.
Not every end-in-view an agent forms represents an end that they value as an end-initself. Some of the ends represented by their ends-in-view are ones that they value only
instrumentally. That is, they are valued only as a means to an end. Recall from chapter two
Gouinlock’s example of the cook preparing the stew. Even though adding salt to the stew was an
end represented by the cook’s end-in-view, the cook did not value that end as an end in itself.
Rather, he only instrumentally valued adding the salt because it was represented by an end-inview formed only in response to a specific problematic situation, which was that the stew needed
to be improved. If the stew was fine the way it was, then adding salt would not have been an end
represented by the cook’s end-in-view. Because the cook formed the end-in-view of adding the
salt only because the stew just happened to require salt, we can say then that the end of adding
salt to the stew is not an end that he would always value. More generally, we can say that if an
agent only instrumentally values an end, then it is not an end that they always value. This points
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to why an agent values their own growth as an end-in-itself. As long as an agent forms ends-inview, growth is an end that they always value, rather than an end that is valued as a specific endin-view in response to a specific situation. Put differently, the agent values their own growth as
an end-in-itself because they value growth whenever they form any end-in-view whatsoever.
This requires explanation.
Recall from earlier in this section that to form an end-in-view is to be motivated to act
upon it, and that any end represented by an end-in-view is one an agent thinks they ought to
realize. In forming the end-in-view of adding salt to the stew, the cook thinks he ought to add
salt, and he undergoes growth in doing so because adding salt means realizing his end-in-view.
Thus, the cook values his own growth by thinking that he ought to add salt to the stew. Now,
even though the cook values his growth if he thinks he ought to add salt, it is not the case that he
values his own growth only if he thinks he ought to add salt to the stew. That is, valuing his
growth is not contingent on thinking he ought to add salt to the stew, such that if he had not
formed that end-in-view he would not have valued his own growth. Because an agent undergoes
growth whenever they realize any end of an end-in-view he has formed and because an agent
thinks they ought to realize the end of any end-in-view he forms, it follows that the agent values
their own growth whenever they form any end-in-view. In other words, the agent cannot form an
end-in-view without thinking that their own growth is valuable, thus making growth an end that
the agent always values. This is why it is not the case that cook values his own growth only if he
thinks he ought to add salt to the stew. He would still value his own growth because he would
have formed a different end-in-view.
How does the fact that an agent values their own growth whenever they form an end-inview imply that they value own growth as an end in itself, rather than only instrumentally?
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Because the agent’s own growth is an end that the agent always values, this indicates that the
agent values his own growth not only instrumentally, but also as an end in itself. Thus, every
agent is committed to valuing growth as an end-in-itself by forming ends-in-view because no
agent can form any end-in-view without growth.
3.3. NPS THEORY – VALUING AGENTS AS ENDS-IN-THEMSELVES
So far I have shown that every agent is, through the formation and pursuit of ends-inview, committed to valuing as an end-in-itself. This section examines how this implies that
every agent must value himself as an end-in-itself.
Recall from the discussion in chapter two that Dewey rejects the strict separation between
ends and means because he holds that the ends of action are not formed apart from the means of
action. Dewey implies that ends and means are inseparable:
It is self-contradictory to suppose that when a fulfillment possesses immediate
value, its means of attainment do not. The person to whom the cessation of a
tooth-ache has value, by that very fact finds value in going to a dentist, or in
whatever else is a means of fulfillment. For fulfillment is as relative to means as
means are to realization. Means-consequences constitute a single undivided
situation.120
For Dewey, then, the means by which an agent realizes their end is also part of the end. Dewey
comments on what this implies about the value agents place on means that are essential to the
realization of certain ends. According to Dewey, if a certain means is indispensable to the
realization of an end, and the agent values that end as an end in itself, then the agent also values
the means as an end in itself:
…contributory values, or utilities, may also exist as final, or immediate values.
What is referred to here is not the stock cases of the miser and his gold. That is
the case where a means finally usurps the place of an end. What is meant is a
case in which means are more than mere means, where they are indispensable
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means. In such cases, any fixed distinction between means and end breaks down.
The two fuse. The means is such a means that it is ‘liked’ for its own sake, as an
integral part of the total end... (original emphasis)121
Since growth is defined as the realization of ends-in-view, it follows that an agent cannot grow if
they do not possess the capacity to form ends-in-view; this makes the agent’s capacity to form
ends-in-view an indispensable means to undergo growth. Because an agent values growth as an
end in itself, it follows that the agent values their capacity to form ends-in-view as an end in
itself. One’s capacity to form ends-in-view serves as an indispensable means to undergo growth,
and this is why the agent values their capacity to form ends-in-view as an end when they value
their own growth. And since it is impossible to possess the capacity to form ends-in-view if one
is not alive, one’s state of being alive serves as an indispensable means for possessing the
capacity to form ends-in-view. Hence, due to the fact that the agent values their capacity to form
ends-in-view as an end in itself, it follows that the agent values their state of being alive as an
end in itself.
Here is the picture of NPS theory so far. Growth enables agents to engage in practical
reasoning by giving them the capacity to form ends-in-view. Because every agent must value
their own growth in order to make any end-in-view, it follows that every agent must value their
own growth as an end-in-itself. Finally, because an agent’s capacity to form ends-in-view, and
therefore the agent’s own state of being alive, is indispensable for the agent to undergo growth, it
follows that every agent, in valuing their own growth as an end-in-itself, is also committed to
valuing themselves as an end-in-itself.
What remains to be shown is why the value of each agent’s growth is objective. That is,
it needs to be shown as to why each agent, in forming ends-in-view, is not only committed to
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valuing their own growth as an end-in-itself, but is also committed to valuing every other agent’s
growth as an end-in-itself. This is the goal of the next section, where I continue the comparison
between the conception of value advanced by Kant, with that advanced by NPS theory, and I
explain why NPS theory considers the value of growth to be extrinsic as well as objective.
3.4. NPS THEORY – THE EXTRINSIC YET OBJECTIVE VALUE OF GROWTH AND OF
AGENTS
Even though growth and humanity share the same conceptual role of accounting for how agents
can engage in practical reasoning, they are not valuable in the same respect. For Kant, the value
of humanity is intrinsic because its goodness is unconditional. Korsgaard supports Kant’s
reasoning and writes,
The early passages of the Foundations emphasize the independence of the value
of the good will from all surrounding circumstances as well as from its results. It
is good in the world or even beyond it…(original emphasis)122
So Kant’s reason that humanity is intrinsically valuable is that its value is unconditional. This
means that it is good apart from the world, apart from all existing circumstances. According to
NPS theory, however, the value of growth is extrinsic.
Growth is extrinsically valuable because, according to Dewey, human beings are part of
the world, and they cannot be understood without grasping the relations that obtain between
them and their surrounding environments. Recall Dewey’s plant and soil illustration from
chapter two where he likened human nature to a plant in an environment that enables it to grow
into a flourishing organism. Likewise, although he uses the term “growth” as a description of
something that happens to subjects, Dewey thinks growth is a process in which both subjects and
their environments play active roles. A subject is said to grow when its relationship with the
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environment undergoes a change that enables the subject to set and achieve ends more
efficiently. Growth, in other words, is a process whereby factors in the subject’s environment
allow the subject to more completely fulfill its nature as a practical subject. As James Gouinlock
writes that “the self is not a substance”123 but “a set of functions with the environment”.124 He
goes on to say that when the self undergoes growth it “becomes more extensive and more
meaningful and it fulfills more diverse and effectual functions in behavior; and at the same time
human energies find fuller and more effective engagement with their surroundings”.125 So,
whether the agent’s problematic situation will, in fact, be resolved upon the moment when they
undergo growth depends on the world, that is, on external states of affairs. This means the value
of growth is conditional, and therefore extrinsic.
In addition to being extrinsic, the value of growth is objective. Each agent’s growth is
objectively valuable because there are no fundamental differences between one agent’s capacity
to form ends-in-view and another’s. Every agent’s capacity to form ends-in-view is equal in
moral worth to every other agent’s capacity to form ends-in-view, and there is thus no basis on
which an agent can hold their capacity to form ends-in-view to be of greater moral worth than
another agent’s capacity. It is wrong to judge that one person’s capacity to form ends-in-view is
of greater moral worth than another. This justifies the wrongness of killing: Since my killing a
person entails destroying their capacity to form ends-in-view, and since I do not desire to destroy
things that I hold to be valuable, making it my end-in-view to kill someone entails that I am
judging that my capacity to form ends-in-view is more valuable than the capacity of the person I
have made it my end-in-view to kill. This judgement does not require me to have an occurrent
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belief that my capacity to form ends-in-view is more valuable. The mere fact that I have made it
my end-in-view to kill someone is sufficient proof that I have made the judgment. As Dewey
writes,
In empirical fact, the measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is not
what he says about its preciousness but the care he devotes to obtaining and using
the means without which it cannot be attained. (original emphasis)126
So because I must use my own capacity to form ends-in-view as the means by which I
accomplish my end of destroying another person’s capacity, my judgment that my capacity is
more valuable than the capacity of the person I have resolved to kill does not need to be an
occurrent belief. If I have made it my end-in-view to kill someone, then I have thereby also
judged that my capacity to form ends-in-view is more valuable than theirs.
Now I am justified in judging my capacity to be more valuable only if my capacity is in
fact more valuable. For my capacity to be more valuable, there must be something about it that
makes it different from the capacity that belongs to the person whose death I have made it my
end to accomplish, aside from the fact that are capacities are numerically distinct. But there is no
such difference to be had. This is because the capacity to form ends-in-view is defined as just
that – the capacity to form ends-in-view – and this is something that I and my intended victim,
call him Bob, both possess. Now it might be thought that there is a difference between our
capacities, and that this difference is found by comparing the ends we each have realized.
Suppose the ends I have realized have led me to become a billionaire philanthropist, and suppose
the ends that Bob has realized have led him to become a drunken vagrant. Does this make my
capacity to form ends-in-view more valuable than Bob’s? The answer is no. This is because
although the ends I have realized have made me more praiseworthy than Bob, my capacity to
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form ends-in-view is not more valuable because it is not contingent on my having realized them.
The fact is that I would still possess the capacity to form ends-in-view even if I did not realize
the ends that led to becoming a billionaire philanthropist. Likewise, Bob would still possess the
capacity to form ends-in-view even if he did not realize the ends that led to becoming a drunken
vagrant. The realization of my ends-in-view led me to become a more praiseworthy person, but
it was not necessary for me to form them in order to possess my capacity. This implies that one’s
capacity to form ends-in-view cannot be evaluated on the basis of the ends one has already
realized.
This means that one’s moral status is not contingent on the specific ends-in-view one has
already formed, but on one’s capacity to form ends-in-view. And since there is no fundamental
difference in this regard between the capacities of different agents, there is no basis on which one
agent is justified in believing that his or her capacity is of greater worth than that of another
agent. Each and every agent’s growth is objective because no agent is justified in prioritizing
their growth over that of another agent’s, and every agent is committed to valuing their own
growth as an end-in-itself.
3.5 END DUTIES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF GROWTH
I have shown that persons are objectively valuable according to NPS theory. The value
of persons is objective because no person can form ends-in-view without valuing themselves as
an end in themselves. The objective value of persons justifies obligations toward them that I call
end-duties. An end duty is a duty to treat persons as ends-in-themselves, which entails not
inhibiting their growth. Recall Kant’s formula of humanity, which states that all persons possess
humanity and should therefore be treated as ends-in-themselves:
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Act so that you use humanity as much in your own person as in the person of
every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means.127
For Kant, the formula of humanity is one formulation of the categorical imperative, which he
used to justify the duty to respect persons as ends-in-themselves. According to NPS theory, end
duties are justified by what I call the principle of growth, which I define as follows: act so as to
not inhibit the growth of any agent, including yourself. The principle of growth is a categorical
imperative that is justified by the objective value of each agent’s growth, which I discussed this
in the previous section.
To inhibit x is to do something that prevents x from occurring. That much is relatively
certain. The task now is to understand what this means in the context of Dewyean growth. What
does it mean to inhibit an agent’s growth? Recall from chapter two that growth is defined as the
realization of ends-in-view. An agent undergoes growth by realizing an end-in-view they
developed in response to having encountered a problematic situation. Also recall from chapter
two that the realization of an end in view is either successful or unsuccessful depending on
whether the realization eliminates the problem that motivated the agent to develop that end in
view in the first place. It is not necessarily the case, then, that one inhibits the growth of another
agent by doing something that makes the agent’s realization of an end-in-view unsuccessful.
Suppose, for instance, that you and I are competing for a job position. I have formed an
end-in-view, which is to submit a job application and resume, in response to a problematic
situation, which is being unemployed. However, you get the job instead. It is true that your
decision to apply for the position prevented me from being hired, but it is not the case that your
decision prevented me from undergoing growth; I still sent in the application, and sending in the
application was the end-in-view I originally developed and sought to realize. Thus, while you
127
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prevented me from successfully realizing an end-in-view, you did not inhibit my growth. Dewey
says this is because the experience of failing to resume their activity upon realizing a particular
end-in-view can teach an agent to form different ends-in-view that are more efficient. This is
why Dewey says “Mistakes are no longer either mere unavoidable accidents to be mourned or
moral sins to be expiated and forgiven… Ends grow, standards of judgment are improved.”128
The possibility of learning from one’s failure to develop better ends in view in the future ensures
that growth takes place even when one fails to realize an end in view successfully.
That the unsuccessful realization of an end-in-view results in growth presupposes that the
agent may continue to form ends-in-view in the future. This points to what it means according to
the principle of growth for one agent to inhibit the growth of another agent. To inhibit an agent’s
growth is to do something that results in the elimination of the possibility for that agent to
subsequently form ends-in-view. The inhibition of growth can occur in one of two ways. The
first way to inhibit an agent’s growth is to kill the that agent. The second way is to do
something, such as inflicting grievous injury, that causes the agent to experience a problematic
situation that is irresolvable. Facing an irresolvable problematic situation results in the loss of
the capacity to form ends-in-view because, as one recalls from section 2.7, it is only when an
agent is faced with a problematic situation that can be resolved that any idea the agent has of an
idea of an end counts as an end-in-view. This explains why you did not inhibit my growth by
getting the job that I wanted. Even though you contributed to my unsuccessful realization of my
end-in-view, this does not mean that my problematic situation cannot ever be resolved. Your
contribution to my failure does not mean that you have violated your end duty to not inhibit my
growth. The principle of growth remains upheld.
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That every agent with the capacity to form ends-in-view is obligated under an end duty to
not inhibit any agent’s growth also means that every agent is obligated under an end duty to not
inhibit their own growth as well. Let us return to the Jack and Ada scenario introduced in
section 2.6 to illustrate this point.
Suppose that Ada’s death leaves Jack feeling like he will never again find that sense of
happiness and fulfillment he had with Ada. He plunges into despair and resolves to end his own
life because to cease existing is to cease experiencing pain. Jack thus thinks that suicide is the
solution to his problem. Because Ada has died, Jack continues to experience the same problem
that he initially encountered when Ada became ill: lack of emotional intimacy. Although Ada’s
death makes it impossible for Jack to have a relationship with her, it does not make it impossible
for him to have a relationship with someone else and rediscover his happiness in a new source of
intimacy. This is not at all unreasonable to imagine, and it is not uncommon for people whose
spouses have died to remarry and experience love once again. Because Jack could follow suit,
his problem is not unresolvable. Remembering that an end-in-view is an idea an agent forms
only if the agent’s problem is resolvable, it is clear that Jack’s problem is resolvable despite
Ada’s death. This, in addition to the fact that he saw killing himself as a solution to his current
misery, means that he formed the idea of killing himself as an end-in-view. I noted earlier that
because no person can set an end for himself to achieve without believing that it should be
realized, and because the person is necessarily instrumental to the achievement of that end, it
follows that no agent can form an end-in-view without also valuing themselves as an end-initself. This points to why it is impermissible for Jack to kill himself. According to NPS theory,
it is impermissible for Jack to commit suicide because he values himself as an end in itself, and
he is bound by an end duty to not kill himself. It should be noted, however, that this is the case
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only if the person’s idea that a certain end will resolve their problematic situation is an end-inview, in which case the agent’s problematic situation must be resolvable. Accordingly, if a
problematic situation is unresolvable, then a person’s idea of their own destruction would not
qualify as an end-in-view, and they would not be bound by an end duty against killing
themselves. I discuss these kinds of occurrences in chapter five.
Before I conclude this chapter, I wish to briefly discuss one advantage that the principle
of growth presents over Kant’s categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is notorious
for being inflexible in its application. According to Kant, it is never permissible to commit any
action which results in treating a person merely instrumentally. This means one should never,
among other things, lie to or steal from someone else. The categorical imperative also entails
that it is impermissible to kill or even harm any person under any circumstance, including
situations that call for self-defense. Like the categorical imperative, the principle of growth
forbids killing because to kill a person is to eliminate the possibility for that person to form endsin-view. This means that actions taken in self-defense are permissible under NPS theory if and
only if they do not kill assailants or permanently deprive them of the capacity to form ends-inview. NPS theory thus advocates pacifism as a matter of principle. It follows from NPS theory
that it is impermissible to kill a person under any circumstance whatsoever. Although pacifism
constitutes a minority view, it is not without precedent. Kant’s categorical imperative, for
instance, promotes it. The advantage of NPS theory over Kant’s categorical imperative,
however, is that NPS theory renders it permissible to harm others in self-defense.

3.6 RECAP
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Having examined the theories of value espoused by Dewey and Kant, I have shown in
this chapter how NPS theory holds that persons are objectively valuable and that each and every
person is morally obligated to avoid inhibiting the growth of others. I have discussed that a
person’s state of being alive is an indispensable means to that person’s growth. Because growth
is valued as an end in itself, it follows that a person’s state of being alive is also valued as an end
in itself. The objective value of growth, in other words, is what justifies the objective value of
persons. The objective value of growth also justifies each person’s moral obligation to avoid
killing another person. This means each person has a duty to not kill any agent or cause any
agent to experience an irresolvable problematic situation. Although I’ve argued the value of
persons, I haven’t made any claims as to what persons are ontologically. That is the crux of NPS
theory and the topic of chapter four.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
PERSONS AS TEMPORALLY EXTENDED SERIES OF EVENTS
4.0 THE ONTOLOGY OF NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC SELFHOOD
The claim that persons are intrinsically valuable cannot be argued for without
presupposing an account as to what persons are. The purpose of this chapter is to more closely
examine the theory of normative pragmatic selfhood (NPS theory) which holds that a person is a
temporally extended series of events. It is worth noting that NPS theory is a theory of personal
ontology, not personal identity. The topic of personal identity is concerned primarily with the
question of what makes a person the same person over time, in other words, who a person is.
The questions surrounding personal ontology, in contrast, are more metaphysical in orientation
and are concerned primarily with the topic of what a person is, metaphysically. I am not
concerned in my dissertation with developing a theory of personal identity. However, since
personal identity is a topic that inspires discussion about personal ontology, I open this chapter
with an exploration of two popular theories of personal identity, the psychological theory and the
narrative theory. I show that both theories are committed to an ontological framework that
ensures their inability to justify the intrinsic value of persons and which underscores the need for
an alternative theory of personal ontology that justifies the intrinsic value of persons. The
chapter concludes by showing how NPS theory satisfies this demand.
4.1 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
The psychological theory originated with the seventeenth-century philosopher John
Locke, who is widely credited for giving personal identity its due as a philosophical topic. In
Book II, chapter 27 of his An Essay on Human Understanding, Locke defines a person as “a
thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the
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same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness,
which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it.”129 Locke states that the
question of a person’s identity is not primarily a question about whether that person is a
particular kind of substance. It is instead a question about how persons can remain identical to
themselves over periods of time. What justifies the claim, for instance, that I was once a fiveyear-old boy even though I am now a thirty-year-old man? Locke held that a person remains
identical to themselves over a period of time by virtue of their memories. As Locke puts it,
For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes
everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other
thinking things: in this alone consists personal identity, i.e., the sameness of a
rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any
past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person.130
So Locke would say that I was the same person as a five-year-old boy if and only if I remember
an experience that that five-year-old had. A formal description of Locke’s theory of personal
identity is as follows: a person at t1 is the same person at t2 if and only if the person at t2 is
capable of recalling an episodic experience they had at t1. Accordingly, if the person at t2 is
incapable of remembering any experience they had at t1, then the person at t2 is numerically
distinct from the person at t1.
Philosophers have pointed out a number of problems with the memory theory, as Locke’s
theory has since become known. First, the memory theory fails to respect the fact that identity
relations are transitive (i.e. a=b, b=c, then a=c). This is problematic because it implies the
contradiction that a person is both identical and not identical to himself. This problem was first
noted by the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, who famously illustrated it
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with the brave officer case. Suppose a ten-year-old boy steals an apple from a neighbor’s
orchard. The boy grows up and forty years later is a brave cavalry officer who remembers
stealing the apple when he was a boy. Later, as a seventy-year-old general, he remembers his
experiences as an officer but no longer remembers stealing the apple when he was ten. Because
identity relations are transitive, it follows on Locke’s account that the general is both identical to
the boy (because the general remembers himself as an officer, who in turn remembered himself
stealing the apple) and is not identical to the boy (because the general has no direct memory of
stealing the apple). This is a contradiction. As Reid presents the scenario,
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robing an
orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to
have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, which must be admitted
to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having
been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his
taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.131
Reid goes on to say that this results in a contradiction:
These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr. Locke’s doctrine, that he who
was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who
took the standard is the same person who was made the general. Whence it
follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him
who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far
back as his flogging: therefore, according to Mr. Locke’s doctrine, he is not the
person who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is not, the
same person with him who was flogged at school.132
A different problem with the memory theory was pointed out by one of Reid’s contemporaries,
the Anglican bishop Joseph Butler. Butler argued that memory relations cannot, as Locke
supposed, constitute personal identity because such relations in fact presuppose identity:
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But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity
to ourselves, yet, to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our
being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment,
nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects
upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal
identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more
than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.133
Butler argued that because any experience a person remembers seems to them to be theirs, the
only way they can know that it is in fact theirs is to already know that they are the person who
actually had it. Memory relations, in other words, reveal to a person that they are identical to a
past experiencer, but they do not reveal to them that they and the past experiencer are the same
person. According to Butler, this shows that memory relations do not constitute personal identity
and that Locke’s theory is invalid.
What philosophers have done to avoid the first problem is to define personal identity in
terms of overlapping psychological connections rather than only in terms of direct memory
relations. Thus, since the general remembers being the officer, he is the same person as the
officer. Since the officer remembers being the boy, he is the same person as the boy. This
makes the general the same person as the boy, not because the general remembers being the boy,
but because he remembers being the person (i.e. the soldier) who at that time of being an officer
could still remember being the boy. This reworking of Locke’s psychological identity theory
where identity is redefined in terms of overlapping psychological connections instead of direct
memory relations exclusively has become known as the psychological continuity theory of
personhood:

133

“X at t1 is the same person as Y at t2 if and only if X is uniquely psychologically

Joseph Butler, “Of Personal Identity,” in Personal Identity, ed. John Perry (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1981), 100.

77
continuous with Y.”134 The psychological continuity theory also has a response to Butler’s
objection that memory relations presuppose identity relations: persons can have quasi-memories
of events whereby a person has a memory of something that may or may not be their past
experience. For example, I can have a quasi-memory of visiting Paris even though I’ve never
actually been there. For me to have a quasi-memory, it is necessary that someone actually had
that certain experience, that I have a memory of the experience, and that memory is causally
dependent on another person’s having an experience. Thus, my quasi-memory of Paris is a firstperson perspective memory, but not the memory of me actually being in Paris.135 Butler’s
objection against Locke was that Locke used memories to explain identity, even though
memories presuppose identity because a person only has memories of the experiences that he
actually had. But according to the psychological continuity theory, diachronic identity, or what
makes an entity identical over time, is preserved via relations of quasi-memory, which means
that the person with the quasi-memory of the experience does not have to be the same person
who actually had the experience in order for those two persons to be numerically identical.
One problem with the psychological continuity theory is that it cannot adequately account
for what makes persons morally valuable. As we will see with the narrative theory of identity,
this problem is not unique to the psychological continuity theory. The problem stems, in fact,
from a topic discussed earlier in chapter one, the naturalistic fallacy. I mentioned in chapter one
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that it is fallacious to think that statements about what we ought to do are logically deducible on
the basis of descriptive facts. How NPS theory solves this will be seen.
Although the psychological theory is a theory of personal identity, not of personal
ontology, it still presupposes a particular understanding of how persons exist. Endurantism and
perdurantism are theories about how concrete entities persist through time and which I
characterize as supporting the following theses:
Thesis of personal endurance (TPE): Persons persist by enduring through time.
Thesis of personal perdurance (TPP): Persons persist by perduring through time.
The psychological theory of personal identity presupposes that TPE is true and that TPP is false.
Endurantism holds that entities lack temporal parts; although the endurantist believes entities
exist in and persist through time, they does not think this means they are spread out or extended
through time. According to endurantism, an entity exists at time t1 by being wholly present at t1.
For an entity X to be wholly present at a moment t1 is for X to have all of its parts exist at t1.
This understanding of what it means for an entity to exist at a single moment underlies the notion
of diachronic identity to which the psychological theory is committed. Locke believed that if a
person who exists at t2 remembers having an experience at t1, then the person at t2 is the same
person as the person who existed and had the experience at t1. The idea that a person can be
numerically identical to themselves across a period of time is not feasible apart from the
assumption that each person is not wholly present at the time they exist. This is because if a
person is not wholly present at the time they exist, it would be impossible for them to be
identical to any person that existed at a past time. This is integral to the psychological theory of
personal identity. As Locke writes,
This being premised to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider
what Person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has
reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in
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different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is
inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being
impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive.136
Thus, the notion of diachronic identity, and thus the psychological theory of personal identity,
are therefore intelligible only on the assumption that endurantism with respect to persons is true.
Note Locke’s remark that a person can consider itself at different times and places “only by that
consciousness.”137 In other words, who a person is at the present moment depends on what that
person remembers at that time. Accordingly, if a presently existing person does not remember
any past experiences, then that person is not identical to anyone. This shows that for the
psychological theory, the present moment is the focal point of a person’s identity: who I am now
depends on what I remember now. This is consistent with the idea that a person persists through
time by being wholly present at each time of that person’s existence, as well as with the broader
idea that whatever exists does so only at the present moment. This idea is called presentism, and
according to Michael J. Loux, endurantism is committed to it:
Typical endurantists are what we might call presentists. They believe that the use
of the tenses is ontologically significant. As they see it, only what exists in the
present really exists and only what is going on in the present is really going on.
Endurantists deny that things that have already passed out of existence or things
that have not yet begun to exist are real or exist in any way.138
Loux states that the present moment plays a special role in the endurantist’s description of what
exists because the endurantist believes the present moment is the only moment that is real. This
is in stark contrast to perdurantism. According to perdurantism, entities have temporal parts,
which means that entities persist through time by being extended through time. This leads the
perdurantist to reject presentism and to deny that entities persist through time by being wholly
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present at each moment of their existence, holding instead that all times are equally real. As
Loux writes,
Perdurantists, by contrast, deny that there is anything ontologically distinctive
about the time I happen to call “now” or “the present,” and they deny that there is
anything metaphysically privileged about the use of the present tense. They take
all times and their contents to have the same ontological status. All times, all the
things existing at those times, and all the things that happen at those times are
equally real; and they insist that the ‘are’ here is a tenseless form of the verb…
Using tenseless language, we can say that both Bill Clinton and George
Washington exist. Each exists, to be sure, in his own time, but each fully
exists.139
A different way of expressing the same point is that perdurantism is committed to a view called
four-dimensionalism. Michael C. Rea describes four-dimensionalism below:
Four-dimensionalism…is a view about the ontological status of non-present
objects. Presentists say that only present objects exist. There are no dinosaurs,
though there were such things; there are no cities on Mars, though perhaps there
will be such things. Four-dimensionalists, on the other hand, say that there are
past or future objects (or both); and in saying this, they mean to put such things
ontologically on a par with present objects. According to the four-dimensionalist,
non-present objects are spatially distant objects: they exist, just not here, where
we are.140
So the perdurantist thinks that entities are temporally extended, and that all times are equally
real. To hold that a person perdures is to hold that a person’s present state of existence is only a
single part of what that person is: an event that extends into the past and encompasses all the
events when that person was alive. This implies that a person continues to exist after they die
because the moment of their death is but a single temporal part of themselves. I will elaborate
upon this idea later. Because the psychological theory is committed to the thesis of personal
endurance (TPE), it denies that persons exist beyond death. The psychological theory is
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committed to TPE because it presupposes the possibility of diachronic identity, and it grounds
diachronic identity in psychological relations that connect past and present states of a person’s
existence. Thus, since one’s death entails the destruction of one’s psychology, it follows that
persons, according to the psychological theory, cease to exist upon the moment of death. And
since the thesis of personal perdurance (TPP) entails that persons continue to exist beyond death,
it follows that the psychological theory is incompatible with TPP.
In summary, the psychological theory of personal identity is committed to TPE. The
importance of this point will become apparent in section 4.3 when I discuss how a commitment
to endurantism renders the psychological theory unable to account for the intrinsic value of
persons and how NPS theory’s commitment to TPP contributes to the its ability to account for
the intrinsic value of persons. For now, however, let us discuss the narrative theory of
personhood to see why it too is committed to TPE.
4.2 NARRATIVE THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
Marya Schechtman notes that the psychological continuity theory is an attempt to provide
an answer to what she refers to as the “reidentification question”141, which asks what the
conditions are where a person at one moment of time was the same person at a different moment
of time. It asks, in other words, how I am the same person that I was in the past. The
reidentification question is concerned with diachronic identity, the matter of how two existing
things at two different moments of time are numerically identical. Schechtman writes,
The problem of personal identity is thus generally described as the problem of
determining what relation must hold between two “person-stages” [or “person
time slices” – I use the terms interchangeably] to make them stages or slices of
the same person. This statement of the question is common, but there is
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disagreement worth discussing about exactly how time-slices are to be
conceived.142
This disagreement about understanding the concept of a time slice is problematic for any account
of personal identity, such as the psychological continuity theory, that relies on the idea of person
slices, or persons as they exist at an instantaneous moment of time. According to Schechtman,
time slices are instantaneous moments of time, and the various psychological states that the
psychological continuity theory considers relevant to personal identity are not instantaneous in
their duration:
Beliefs, values, desires, intentions, actions, and characteristics are things that
cannot take place in an instant. A literal instant is not even long enough to
experience something as basic as pleasure or pain; it is not long enough to see an
afterimage, or hear a tone – let alone be loyal, have doubts about one’s religion, or
be moody or consistent… To do any of the things that are recognizable as the
activities of persons, a person-stage must endure for at least several seconds. To
have some rich enough complement of characteristics to be anything like a
“person identified at a time,” a person time-slice probably has to last at least
several minutes, perhaps even much longer. If, then, we want to build a criterion
of identity over time by identifying distinct temporal stages as stages of the same
person, these stages have to endure long enough for them to be person-like in
their characteristics.143
Schechtman’s point here is that since the relevant psychological attributes such as beliefs are not
instantaneous, they cannot be appealed to in order to account for a person’s identity at a single
instant of time. This suggests that a successful account of personal identity must be able to
answer the question of what a person’s identity is at a single instant of time. According to
Schechtman, the psychological continuity theory cannot answer this question, but the narrative
theory of personhood can.
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According to the narrative theory of personal identity, a person’s identity at a given
moment in time is a story the person tells about themselves up until that moment. The narrative
theory of personhood holds that in order to be a person, an entity must not only possess
psychological states such as beliefs and memories of experiences, but it must also be aware that
it possesses these states in order for them to be meaningful, i.e., to make its life a coherent story.
The theory claims this is possible only if the entity’s awareness takes the form of a self-narrated
story, and it is this story that constitutes the entity’s identity as a person. David Shoemaker
explains,
Narrative identity is thus really about a kind of psychological unity, but not just
an artless or random unity. Imagine, for instance, a subject of experiences to
whom various experiences merely happened over time. The events would be
unified in a purely passive respect, simply as the experiences contained within the
life of that subject of experiences. But for that subject to be a person, a genuine
moral agent, those experiences must be actively unified, must be gathered
together into the life of one narrative ego by virtue of a story the subject tells that
weaves them together, giving them a kind of coherence and intelligibility they
wouldn't otherwise have had. This is how the various experiences and events
come to have any real meaning at all — rather than being merely isolated events
— by being part of a larger story that relates them to one another within the
context of one life…(original emphasis)144
Shoemaker points out that narrative theory is grounded in the capacity for conscious thought, but
it is problematic to make that a requirement for personhood. It is counterintuitive to claim, for
example, that I was never a six-month-old infant simply because I do not remember being six
months old and am therefore unable to incorporate my experiences as a six-month-old infant into
a story. This shows the narrative theory to be an even less plausible account of personhood than
the psychological theory, which at least allows the possibility for one’s identity to not depend
solely on direct memory relations.
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Perhaps the most well-known objection to the narrative theory is that it is simply not
necessary to think of oneself as a character in an ongoing narrative in order to find one’s beliefs
and experiences meaningful. Galen Strawson addresses this objection in “Against Narrativity.”
According to Strawson, the narrative theory entails a commitment to what he calls the
psychological narrativity thesis, which holds that “one sees or lives or experiences one’s life as a
narrative or story of some sort, or at least as a collection of stories.”145 Strawson says the
psychological narrativity thesis “is a straightforwardly descriptive, empirical thesis about the
way ordinary, normal human beings experience their lives. This is how we are, it says, this is
our nature”.146 So the psychological narrativity thesis is a descriptive thesis about human
psychology. Accordingly, if there are persons who do not actually experience their lives as
narratives, then the psychological narrativity thesis is false, which implies that the narrative
theory of personhood is false as well.
This is, in fact, how Strawson argues against the narrative theory of personhood.
Strawson says that there are “diachronics”147 and “episodics”148. A diachronic is a person who
sees his life as an unfolding narrative and who thereby conforms to the psychological narrativity
thesis. The diachronic sees himself as a consistent character that plays throughout his life, or as
Strawson puts it, as “something that was there is in the (further) past and will be there in the
(further) future.”149 An episodic, on the other hand, is someone who does not experience his life
as a story. The episodic is aware of the fact that he has a past and future, but he does not think of
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himself as a consistent character in a story, as does the diachronic. Strawson considers himself
to be an episodic, and uses himself as an example in the following passage to describe how
episodics think of themselves:
I need to say more about the Episodic (sic) life, and since I find myself to be
relatively Episodic, I’ll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human
being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount
of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences
‘from the inside’, as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my
life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely
none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a
great deal of concern for my future.150
Strawson makes the point here that one can consistently be aware of the fact that one has a past
without thinking of one’s life as a narrative. He goes on to suggest that just because episodics do
not understand their lives as narratives does not mean that their pasts are irrelevant to their
present identities:
Faced with sceptical Diachronics, who insist that Episodics are (essentially)
dysfunctional in the way that they relate to their own past, Episodics will reply
that the past can be present or alive in the present without being present or alive
as the past. The past can be alive – arguably more genuinely alive – in the present
simply in so far as it has helped to shape the way one is in the present, just as
musicians’ playing can incorporate and body forth their past practice without
being mediated by any explicit memory of it. (original emphasis)151
What Strawson is saying here is that a person’s identity is inextricably tied to past events,
regardless of whether that person is a diachronic or an episodic. NPS theory also holds that a
person’s past does not need to be narrated in order for it to make an impact on that person’s
present identity. Who I am now remains an outcome of past events even if I do not remember
what those events were and am therefore unable to organize them into the form of a narrative. I
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take this to be what Strawson means when he says that the past, for a person, can be alive in the
present without being alive in the past. NPS theory builds on this idea, as we will see in section
4.3.
As noted earlier, narrative theory, like the psychological theory, is committed to the
thesis of personal perdurance, although one might think otherwise because of the tendency of
some writers to discuss the narrative self as a temporally extended entity. For instance, take
Shoemaker’s remark that a person, according to the narrative theory, is an “extended narrative
ego”152:
This view purports to account for our practical concerns in a far more adequate
way than the previous accounts of numerical identity. So it makes sense for me to
rationally anticipate some future experiences only if they will be mine, where
what makes them mine is that they will fit coherently and accurately into my own
ongoing self-told story. What explains my special sort of concern for myself is
that I'm in fact an extended narrative ego — not some present time-slice
concerned about the well-being of some different future time-slice.153
And take Schechtman’s comment that consciousness, according to the narrative theory, is
extended through time:
We acknowledge that the depth of connection between psychical elements that are
synchronously co-conscious is such that they are not properly thought of as a
number of separate elements that are somehow all together in the same container
– a “consciousness” – but rather as having interacted in such a way as to fuse into
a unified whole that includes some version of each, modified by its
context…What the narrative self-constitution view suggests is that something
similar happens for elements spread out over time that are part of the same
narrative. The moments of conscious awareness in a person’s life are not distinct
entities that are somehow strung together, but rather a dynamic interactive system
that integrates to produce a subjectivity that extends over time.154
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Such comments are misleading because the narrative theory, like the psychological theory, is
built on the possibility of diachronic identity: any element of the story that a person tells about
their life is an experience they remember having, which implies that the person who had that past
experience is numerically identical to the person who is now remembering it. As I pointed out in
my discussion of the psychological theory, this is possible only if each person is wholly present
at each moment of their existence. Thus, narrative theory is committed to TPE. It is committed
to TPE because it is built on the possibility of diachronic identity, which entails a commitment to
presentism, the idea that an entity is wholly present at each moment of its existence. This makes
the narrative theory incompatible with TPP.
4.3 NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC SELFHOOD AND THE THESIS OF PERSONAL
PERDURANCE
In the previous section, I showed how the psychological theory and the narrative theory
are each committed to the thesis of personal endurance. I now turn to NPS theory and its
commitment to the thesis personal perdurance. I will also discuss how this commitment factors
into the moral status of persons. NPS theory is committed to TPP because it holds that persons
are temporally extended events: each person is what we may call that person’s “life”, and the
lives of persons are temporally extended. Tara Smith illustrates this with an analogy that
captures precisely the concept of a person’s life that NPS theory advances:
Life is not something that a person possesses alongside the living that she does.
Rather, life is living. A person’s life consists of an ongoing series of events – the
actions she takes and the experiences she undergoes [including those unconscious
physiological operations]. Just as the sixth game of the 1986 World Series refers
to a particular set of activities – the nine innings played by those two teams in that
stadium on that night, encompassing all the pitches, foul balls, hits, time-outs,
arguments, player substitutions, etc., therein – so “Valerie’s life” refers to all the
activities that make up every day she has breathed, from the moment she was born
through the present and into the future, until her death. Life is nothing but the
stream of activities that constitute some individual’s experience. Birth initiates
this self-generated, self-sustaining activity; death marks its cessation. As Hans
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Jonas has stated, an “organism has to keep going, because to be going is its very
existence.” Activity is the essence of life.155
Smith here states that a person’s life consists of all the experiences and actions that that person
has gone through since the time they were born. These things of course exist in the past. So to
claim that persons are their lives is to claim that persons are temporally extended, and that TPP is
true. Put differently, NPS theory holds that a person is their life history. It is interesting to note
that Dewey himself seemed to have held a view like this:
Except as the outcome of arrested development, there is no such thing as a fixed,
ready-made, finished self. Every living self causes acts and is itself caused in
return by what it does. All voluntary action is a remaking of self, since it creates
new desires, instigates to new modes of endeavor, brings to light new conditions
which institute new ends. Our personal identity is found in the thread of
continuous development which binds together these changes.156
Without a doubt, Dewey is at the core of my dissertation, and this passage affirms that NPS
theory is consistent with Dewey’s thoughts about the nature of personhood.
A baseball game is an example of a temporally extended entity. Although it is true that
the ninth inning would not have occurred if the first inning had not, the mere fact that the ninth
stands in a causal relation to the first is merely a necessary condition for the ninth and first
innings to exist as parts of the one and the same game. It is not the only condition – the first
inning would not have occurred if the Big Bang had not happened, but that does not make the
Big Bang part of the game. The ninth and the first are parts of the same game because, among
other reasons, they each involve activities identified with the game of baseball (e.g. hitting a ball
with a bat, running to bases, etc.). The Big Bang is not a part of the baseball game because it
doesn’t involve any baseball activities. Thus, it is in part that the innings share a common trait
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(the occurrence of baseball-related activities) that makes them part of one and the same entity,
the baseball game.
Accordingly, if a person is a temporally-extended event, then a smaller event is a part of
that person if it stands in an immediate causal relation to another event, and each event indexes
something that exemplifies a concept that is essential to the concept of a person. These are the
conceptual guidelines that NPS theory uses to individuate persons. Since NPS theory
presupposes TPP, I cannot begin to argue that NPS theory is the correct account of personal
ontology without first providing reasons as to why it should be thought that TPP is true.
TPP states that persons exist as temporally extended events. One reason for thinking
TPP is true is that it justifies our everyday intuitions about how we think about persons. For
instance, we often judge persons as being either good or bad, and whether a person is good or
bad cannot be established independently of the events that have made up that person’s life.
“Life” is to be understood here in the biographical sense, not in the biological sense of the state
of being alive (SOBA). Chapter five will show that it is this biographical sense of life that
possesses extrinsic objective value. Mother Theresa is a good person because her life was a life
spent helping those in need when she was alive. Ted Bundy is a bad person because his life was
spent raping and killing women when he was alive. Our descriptions of persons, therefore, are
really descriptions of the lives of those persons. Since lives are temporally extended, our
descriptions of persons are descriptions of temporally extended events.
Another reason for thinking that TPP is true is that it solves the problem of posthumous
reference, which is the problem of referring to posthumous, and therefore non-existent, things.
The problem is enough of an issue to motivate some philosophers to accept not only TPP, but
four-dimensionalism in general. Take the following passage from W.V.O. Quine, for instance:
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There are overwhelming reasons for treating time on a par with space; reasons of
clarity and convenience, having nothing to do with Einstein's relativity theory. We
say Elsa Lanchester is the widow of Charles Laughton; but there is no Charles
Laughton for her to be the widow of, and there never was any, either, as long as
she was his widow. We say that Charles Laughton married Elsa Lanchester,
moreover, and yet we refuse to conclude that he married his own widow. We say
there have been fifty-five kings of England, though there never once were more
than three people who had been kings of England or ever would be. The simplest
way of putting all this mess in order is by viewing people and other physical
objects as deployed in four-dimensional space-time and all as coexisting in an
eternal or timeless sense of the word. Temporal segments or stages of physical
objects are physical objects in turn, temporally shorter ones. Elsa Lanchester's
widow- hood is a part of her, the later part. . . . In these terms my little anomalies
are easily straightened out....157
This passage is an argument for four-dimensionalism in general, not TPP. Can one consistently
hold a commitment to TPP while also rejecting four-dimensionalism with regard to everything
else? Answering this question is beyond the scope of this dissertation, although I see no reason
for immediately thinking that the answer is no. One can of course argue for TPP by arguing for
four-dimensionalism, but such arguments are also beyond the scope of my dissertation. I
mention the problem of posthumous reference because it forms the basis of an argument that
shows how NPS theory supports the intrinsic value of persons, as will be seen later in this
chapter.
Recall that TPP is the thesis that persons perdure, or exist as temporally extended events.
NPS theory is committed to TPP due to the fact that NPS theory holds that persons are events
that are temporally extended into the past because a person is the history of an entity, a history
that begins when that entity began to have desires. The idea of a person as a history of an entity
is consistent with Dewey’s views about personal ontology. He writes, for instance,
The individual whose life history is told, be it Socrates or Nero, St. Francis or
Abraham Lincoln, is an extensive event; or, if you prefer, it is a course of events
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each of which take up into itself something of what went before and leads on to
that which comes after. The skill, the art, of the biographer is displayed in his
ability to discover and portray the subtle ways, hidden often from the individual
himself, in which one event grows out of those which preceded and enters into
those which follow. The human individual is himself a history, a career, and for
this reason his biography can be related only as a temporal event.158
Gerard E. Mozur also comments,
There is, of course, the man, Lincoln, i.e. the physical organism, but Lincoln, the
individual, is the total career and history involving the interaction of Lincoln with
the environmental conditions of his time.159
These passages reflect Dewey’s belief that there is an ontological difference between an
organism, an entity, and the history of that entity, which is a person. Briefly stated then, the
reason NPS theory is committed to TPP is that the theory holds that a person is the history of an
organism, and histories are events that are temporally extended into the past.
NPS theory holds that a person is the history of an entity that has desires, desire being
understood here in the Deweyan sense of the term, as was discussed in the previous chapter.
Remember that in the Deweyan sense to desire is to make plans and to pursue goals. Confronted
with a problematic situation, a person desires an end of an action by forming an end-in-view that
if acted upon will resolve the problem that motivated them to form the idea in the first place.
Thus, since NPS theory defines a person as an entity that has had desires, the theory in effect
defines a person as an entity that has had ends-in-view. This explain why persons are temporally
extended events: persons are temporally extended events because they possess ends-in-view, and
the possession of an end-in-view is itself temporally extended.
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To understand how the possession of an end-in-view is a temporally extended event, keep
in mind that an end-in-view is a goal. In pursuing a goal, there is the sense that one’s goals
extend into the past because one cannot succeed in pursuing any goal without remembering what
one is trying to achieve. Thus the activity of pursuing a goal is a temporally-extended event, a
duration that encompasses the past, present, and future. This is why Charles Sherover describes
the activity of pursuing a goal as a “spread of time”:
I invoke memory for precedents to guide me in the evaluation of this possibility
and its attainment. But my evaluation of my present situation, which calls me to
act, is in terms of what ought to be in it that could be in it which I can place into
it. That aspect of my past experience which I call into the present is precisely that
memory selection which seems pertinent to the task lying ahead of me. I then see
this situation as my own involvement in terms of a future which is not-yet, but
which I bring into the present, and a past which is no-longer, but which I bring
into the present. The present situation is, then, no point on a line of before-andafter sequences. It is not the click of a full second, the “specious present” of some
ten or twelve seconds. It is a spread of time, as I perceive and understand it,
which takes my perspective of future and selected recall of the relevant past into
constituting what I take to be present situation.160
Sherover’s description of the phenomenological experience of pursuing a goal aptly describes the
phenomenological experience of having an end-in-view. To have an end-in-view is to not
simply have an idea of an end. An end-in-view is an idea of an end that one is motivated to act
upon and does indeed act upon. Remember from chapter three that desire, for Dewey, involves
effort: if a person believes a certain end will transform his problematic situation into a
consummatory one, but does not act upon it, then the end is not the object of their desire. Their
idea of the end is not an end-in-view, but is instead what Dewey calls a wish or fantasy.
In short, to have an end-in-view is to engage in goal-directed action. This is why Sherover’s
description of experience of pursuing a goal is a fitting description of the phenomenology of
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having an end-in-view. Activity is essential to both concepts. Although the following passage is
from Dewey, it could just as well have been written by Sherover:
“Present” activity is not a sharp narrow knife-blade in time. The present is
complex, containing within itself a multitude of habits and impulses. It is
enduring, a course of action, a process including memory, observation and
foresight, a pressure forward, a glance backward and a look outward.161
This confirms Sherover’s point that pursuit of a goal is temporally extended. To further illustrate
the idea of present activity as a complex element, Dewey gives the example of building a house:
Building a house is a typical instance of an intelligent activity. It is an activity
directed by a plan, a design. The plan is itself based upon a foresight of future
uses. This foresight is in turn dependent upon an organized survey of past
experiences and of present conditions, a recollection of former experiences of
living in houses and an acquaintance with present materials, prices, resources, etc.
Now if a legitimate case of subordination of present to regulation of the future
may anywhere be found, it is in such a case as this. For a man usually builds a
house for the sake of the comfort and security, the “control”, thereby afforded to
future living rather than just for the fun – or the trouble – of building. If in such a
case inspection shows that, after all, intellectual concern with the past and future
is for the sake of directing present activity and giving it meaning, the conclusion
may be accepted for other cases.162
The experience of having an end-in-view, then, is the experience of pursuing a goal. This is
because, once again, ends-in-view are goals. Accordingly, since ends-in-views are goals, it
seems phenomenologically that one’s possession of an end-in-view is a temporally extended
event.
There is a difference, of course, between something that seems to be the case and
something that is the case, and NPS theory’s holding that one’s possession of an end-in-view not
only seems to be temporally extended, but it is in fact temporally extended. Just because I now
have an idea of a certain end that I could not have had without remembering certain things in the
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past does not mean that the idea itself is extended into the past. Rather, it is the possession of the
idea that is extended into the past because the end-in-view is formed in response to a problematic
situation.
If a person does not face a problematic situation, then they do not form an end-in-view.
It is on the basis of examining their problematic situation and of understanding it as a product of
a past series of causes and effects that the person knows what end-in-view is appropriate to form.
This is the point that Dewey makes in the passage below, where he writes about how a mere idea
becomes an end-in-view:
A fancy becomes an aim, in short, when some past sequence of known cause-andeffect is projected into the future, and when by assembling its causal conditions
we strive to generate a like result. We have to fall back upon what has already
happened naturally without design, and study how it happened, which is what is
meant by causation. (original emphasis)163
So a problematic situation is an event in a sequence of causes and effects, and an idea becomes
an end-in-view only if one examines events that actually happened and that led to the creation of
the problematic situation that one now faces. Thus, since the content of an end-in-view is
determined by events that occurred before the end-in-view itself was formed, the content of
one’s end in view is intrinsically tied to events that happened in the past, and this makes one’s
possession of an end-in-view a temporally extended event. Put differently, one’s possession of
an end-in-view is temporally extended because the series of events that caused a problematic
situation is essential to the specific end that is now in one’s view. The possession is an event that
extends from the specific end-in-view now being pursued back to what caused the problematic
situation that led one to develop that end-in-view. That is why Dewey describes having and
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pursuing an end-in-view as a “career”, which suggests that the possession of an end-in-view is an
event that is not wholly present:
Empirically, all reflection sets out from the problematic and confused. Its aim is
to clarify and ascertain. When thinking is successful, its career closes in
transforming the disordered into the orderly, the mixed-up into the distinguished
or placed, the unclear and ambiguous into the defined and unequivocal, the
disconnected into the systematized.164
Dewey articulates this point in the following passage, where he suggests that while an end-inview is an idea and therefore lacks temporal extension in itself, it does not exist apart from the
disposition of the person to actively pursue it.
In truth, attitudes, dispositions and their kin, while capable of being distinguished
and made concrete intellectual objects, are never separate existences. They are
always of, from, toward, situations and things…The things with which they are
concerned may for purposes of inquiry be represented by a blank, a symbol to be
specifically filled in as occasion demands. But except as ways of seeking, turning
from, appropriating, treating things, they have no existence nor significance.
(original emphasis)165
Dewey states in this passage that holding an end-in-view is intrinsically connected to the events
leading up to its formation and cannot exist separately from those events. Thus, since to possess
an end-in-view is to be disposed to act upon an idea, Dewey’s claim that the disposition of
holding an end-in-view is not separable from past events is consistent with the thesis that one’s
possession of an end-in-view is an event that is temporally extended into the past.
I stated at the beginning of this section that NPS theory is committed to TPP and that a
person is temporally extended into the past because a person is the history of an entity that has
begun to have desires. I have since pointed out that to have a desire is to possess an end-in-view.
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This is consistent with Dewey’s comments about how persons begin to exist only when entities
have begun to have desires:
Return for a moment to the human individual. It is impossible to think of the
historical career, which is the special individuality constituting Abraham Lincoln,
apart from the particular conditions in which he lived…The career which is his
unique individuality is the series of interactions in which he was created to be
what he was by the ways in which he responded to the occasions with which he
was presented (my emphasis).166
The last sentence is a description of what is involved in possessing an end-in-view: it affords the
person with a way of responding to a problematic situation. This means that one’s existence as a
person is constituted by possessing one’s ends-in-view – it is by possessing an end-in-view that
one creates oneself as a person. To possess an end-in-view, in other words, is to engage in selfcreation. Hence Dewey’s comments:
Lincoln as an individual is a history; any particular event cut off from that history
ceases to be a part of his life as an individual. As Lincoln is a particular
development in time, so is every other human individual. Individuality is the
uniqueness of the history, of the career, not something given once and for all at
the beginning which then proceeds to unroll as a ball of yarn may be unwound.
Lincoln made history. But it is just as true that he made himself as an individual
in the history he made.167
And also,
In committing oneself to a particular course, a person gives a lasting set to his
own being. Consequently, it is proper to say that in choosing this object rather
than that, one is in reality choosing what kind of person or self one is going to
be.168
Taken together, these passages imply that a person begins to exist only when an entity has begun
to have desires because to have a desire is to possess an end-in-view, and to possess an end-inview is to engage in the activity of self-creation. A person exists only when an entity has begun
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to possess ends-in-view, in other words, because it is only through the possession of ends-inview that a person is created.
This raises the question as to the significance of possessing an end-in-view that makes a
person exist as an event that is temporally extended into the past. Recall that the possession of
an end-in-view is temporally extended because an end-in-view is an idea that a person forms by
thinking about events that actually happened in the past. This makes possession of an end-inview in the present contingent on non-present events and therefore temporally extended. The
reason a person is temporally extended into the past is because the possession of an end-in-view
is extended into the past, and it is only through the possession of an end-in-view that a person
emerges as a thing that exists. That is why Dewey states,
Personality, selfhood, subjectivity are eventual functions that emerge with
complexly organized interactions, organic and social. Personal individuality has
its basis and conditions in simpler events. (my emphasis)169
The “simpler events” Dewey refers to are events pertaining to the interaction of an organism
with its wider environment. Thus persons are generated through the interaction of organisms
with their environment and by organisms possessing ends-in-view in reaction to problematic
situations. A person is therefore the organism’s history of forming and possessing ends-in-view,
which is why a person begins to exist only when an organism has begun to have desires. This is
how NPS theory accounts for the temporal extension of persons, and thus for its commitment to
TPP.
4.4 ADVANTAGES OF NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC THEORY
NPS theory presents a number of advantages over the psychological and narrative
theories of personhood. It was discussed that one problem with the psychological theory and its
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variant, the psychological continuity theory, is their failure to account for the persistence of one’s
identity through memory loss. According to the original psychological theory, proposed by
Locke, a presently existing person is not identical to a person in the past if the former fails to
remember an experience that the latter had. The more recent version of the psychological theory,
the psychological continuity theory, suffers from the same problem as well, since it is possible
for a person to fail to quasi-remember a past experience. Another problem with that affects both
versions of the psychological theory was pointed out by Schechtman. Both versions rely on the
concept of the time-slice to account for diachronic identity. As Schechtman explained, since
both versions hold that diachronic identity is grounded in psychological relations between past
and present states of being, a time-slice serves as an inadequate model of a person’s momentary
existence because psychological states, too, cannot be understood as time-slices.
Schechtman proposed the narrative theory of personhood as an alternative. But although
the narrative theory rejects the idea of persons as time-slices, the theory was still shown to rely
on psychological relations to ground diachronic identity, revealing it to be just as susceptible as
the psychological theory to the memory loss problem. In addition, since there are persons that do
not understand themselves in autobiographical terms, as Strawson pointed out, the narrative
theory falls short on inclusivity: episodics are not persons.
NPS theory avoids all the problems that were shown to affect the psychological and
narrative theories. NPS theory holds that a person is a temporally extended series of actions.
Therefore, unlike the psychological and narrative theories, a person’s identity according to NPS
theory is not constituted by connecting psychological relations. It is instead constituted by a
causally continuous sequence of action that extends from the person’s first formation of an endin-view to that person’s present state of existence. That a present person does not remember
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forming and acting upon a particular end-in-view in the past does not mean that the present
person is not identical to the person who formed and acted upon the end-in-view. The two
persons are identical according to NPS theory because they are connected by a temporally
extended series of events, the causally continuous sequence of actions. Even if the present
person does not remember having formed and acted upon a particular end-in-view, they are still
identical to the person who formed and acted upon it because it was through the formation of and
acting upon that end-in-view that the present person came to exist in the present. So one chief
advantage that NPS theory has over the psychological and narrative theories is that, because a
person’s identity is not constituted by psychological relations, the theory is able to account for
the persistence of a person’s identity through the occurrence of memory loss. One advantage
that NPS theory has over the narrative theory in particular is that NPS theory provides a
conception of persons as temporally extended entities without requiring persons to engage in
narrative construction.
Perhaps the greatest advantage NPS theory has over the psychological and narrative
theories is that it appeals to the nature of personhood to justify the wrongness of killing persons.
This is something that neither the psychological theory nor the narrative theory can provide.
According to chapter three, killing a person is wrong because to do so would be to assume that
one person’s capacity to form ends-in-view is more valuable than another person’s. This
assumption is wrong because, due to the fact that each and every person’s capacity to form endsin-view stems from the mere fact that they exist as a person, the moral value of each and every
person’s capacity to form ends-in-view is justified on the same basis, which implies that there is
no basis on which one person can hold their capacity to be more valuable than another’s. The
wrongness of killing persons, then, is justified on the same basis as that which accounts for the

100
existence of persons as temporally extended entities: the capacity to form ends-in-view. NPS
theory is thus able to justify the wrongness of killing persons by appealing to the nature of
personhood.
A related advantage held by NPS theory is that it avoids at least one argument against the
claim that death is not harmful to persons. According to this argument, if death harms a person
who dies, then there must be a subject that is harmed by death. However, if a person ceases to
exist at the moment of their death, then there is no subject to be harmed, and a person’s death
therefore cannot be harmful to himself.170 Call this argument the unharmful-death argument.
The unharmful-death argument poses a problem only under the assumption that TPE is true. Let
us examine why.
Because TPE holds that a person is an entity that exists wholly at each moment of its
existence, it follows from TPE that person would cease to exist at the moment of their death.
This is because if an entity exists wholly at each moment of its existence, then the present is the
only moment when an existing entity does exist. If that entity does not exist in the present, then
there is no moment at which it does exist, and so it follows that it does not exist at all.
Accordingly, if a person were this sort of entity, then a person would cease to exist when they
die, and their death would not be harmful to themselves because they would no longer be a
subject that can incur harm. So, if a person were to exist wholly at each moment of their
existence, then that person cannot be harmed by their own death. This is how the unharmfuldeath argument poses a problem for TPE.
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NPS theory avoids the unharmful-death argument because NPS theory is committed to
TPP. TPP, as one recalls, holds that persons do not exist wholly at each moment of their
existences. A person is instead a temporally extended entity composed of parts that are dispersed
across the past. Because these parts extend into the past, they are unaffected by what happens in
the present, and they would therefore continue to exist even when the person to whom they
belong dies. The moment of a person’s death, according to TPP, is just one of many temporal
parts that compose that person. Thus, because the moment of a person’s death is only one of that
person’s temporal parts, and the rest of the person’s parts remain unchanged upon the person’s
death, it follows that these parts would continue to exist after a person dies. The person
continues to exist beyond their own death. Since persons exist beyond their deaths, there are
subjects then for whom death would be harmful to themselves. The unharmful-death argument
thus poses no problem to TPP because TPP denies that persons cease to exist when they die.
Therefore, the argument poses no problem to NPS theory either.
It is often said that the past cannot be undone. There is nothing happening now or in the
future that can change the fact that was has happened has happened. The fact that Bill is now
dead at eighty-years-old, for example, does not make the experiences he had when he was a nineyear-old boy somehow less real than they were when Bill was thirty. His experiences as a nineyear-old boy belonged to the past when he was thirty, and they belong to the past now, when Bill
is no longer alive. This implies that if a person is constituted by their past experiences, it is
inconsistent to deny that they persist beyond their death while accepting that they were persons
while they were still living. This is because a person’s past experiences are a part of the past
regardless of whether the person is dead or alive. In other words, since a living person is
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constituted by past experiences, and that person’s death does not change the fact that they had
those experiences, it follows that that person’s death does not cause them to cease existing.
It should be noted that people do often speak and think about the living in ways which
suggest that they find it intuitive to understand personal identity as a temporally extended series
of events. This suggests that the line of reasoning described above is actually more reasonable
than it might initially appear. For instance, we often say of someone who is alive that “they have
a good life”, as if their life is something that exists wholly in the present, like a table or a chair.
We are also aware that a person’s life consists of past events, of things that do not presently
exist. So since people do not find it strange or counterintuitive to think of a living person’s
identity as a temporally extended series of events, it should not seem strange to accept that one’s
identity persists beyond one’s death, given that the past cannot be undone, and a person’s death
does not therefore change the fact of who they was when they were alive. If a person is
constituted by their past experiences, then that person survives their death. This is how NPS
theory’s commitment to the idea that persons are temporally extended justifies the claim that
persons persist beyond the moment that they die.
Both the psychological and the narrative theories of personhood are subject to the
unharmful-death argument because each is committed to TPE, holding that persons cease to exist
when they die. In contrast, NPS theory avoids the unharmful argument by virtue of its
commitment to TPP. I show in the next chapter how NPS theory’s commitment to TPP bears on
bioethical dilemmas involving marginal cases.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC SELFHOOD AND MARGINAL CASES
5.0 WHAT MARGINAL CASES ARE
This chapter demonstrates the applicability of NPS theory to assess the moral status of
marginal cases. “Marginal case” is a philosophical term of art that refers to an entity whose
moral status is uncertain or controversial. The paradigm of a marginal case is a sentient
organism other than a human being of sufficiently mature and unimpaired cognitive ability. Jeff
McMahan provides a short list of entities that fit this profile:
Among those beings whose nature arguably entails a moral status inferior to our
own are animals, human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, anencephalic
infants, congenitally severely retarded human beings, human beings who have
suffered severe brain damage or dementia, and human beings who have become
irreversibly comatose. These are all beings that are in one way or another “at the
margins.” There are pressing moral questions about the permissibility, in certain
circumstances, of killing individuals of these sorts, or of allowing them to die. 171
So a marginal case is an entity whose moral status is unclear. This presents a problem because,
as McMahan notes, an entity’s moral status largely determines the circumstances under which it
is permissible to treat that entity in certain ways. Moral status is determined on the basis of
whether the entity possesses a morally relevant property or set of properties. Much of the
controversy surrounding marginal cases stems from disagreement over which properties are
thought to be morally relevant. While some philosophers, for instance, hold the morally relevant
property to be the capacity to experience states of pain and pleasure, others consider it to be the
possession of a certain degree of self-awareness and rationality.
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NPS theory holds that the morally relevant property is being valued as an end in itself.
The theory determines which marginal cases are permissible to kill or allow to die by applying
the analysis I presented in chapter three. As one recalls from that chapter, NPS theory holds that
it is wrong to kill an entity or allow it to die if it is protected by an end duty, and an entity is
protected by an end duty if and only if it values itself as an end-in-itself. An entity values itself
as an end-in-itself through the formation of ends-in-view. I argued that if an agent forms endsin-view, then everyone, including the agent themselves, is bound by an end duty to not kill that
agent or do anything else that results in the permanent deprivation of that entity’s capacity to
form ends-in-view.
McMahan claims that animals constitute a class of marginal case, and although I accept
this claim, the ethical subjects I am concerned with in this dissertation are human. Dewey
himself says virtually nothing directly about non-human animals, but it can be inferred from
several of his comments regarding ends-in-view, however, that most animals lack the capacity to
form ends-in-view and would therefore not value themselves as ends.172 By Kant’s account,
non-human animals are not considered persons because they are irrational and lack selfawareness.173 As such, they would not value themselves as ends.
I have only slightly more to say about the cognitively impaired entities in McMahan’s list
of marginal cases. Kant holds that entities possess moral worth only if they possess autonomy,
which he understood to involve having the ability to grasp rational principles, such as
universality, as well as possessing the capacity for self-awareness. It is only these beings, says
Kant, that are persons. Because dementia, Down syndrome, and autism result in reduced
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cognitive capability, it is doubtful that humans suffering from these conditions would be classed
as persons according to Kant’s criteria. It is well-known that human beings that present severe
cases of autism and dementia often experience a diminished sense of self. McMahan offers a
bleak account of this outcome with respect to dementia:
The disease usually presents with a deterioration of memory, which continues
relentlessly through the later stages. As the disease progresses, comprehension,
reasoning, and judgment are increasingly impaired, elements of character become
unstable, linguistic abilities decline, recognition of other people becomes
problematic and eventually impossible, and ultimately even self-awareness is
lost.174
Although self-awareness becomes lost, humans afflicted with dementia or Down syndrome still
possess the capacity to engage in meaningful and goal-directed action, albeit in reduced form,
that is indicative of the capacity to form ends-in-view. There is therefore no reason to believe
that humans afflicted with these and other conditions that result in reduced cognitive capacity,
yet preserve the sufferer’s ability to engage in the level of practical reasoning required for them
to form ends-in-view, cannot value themselves as ends. Their lives are protected by end duties.
If it seems I have shortchanged animals and handicapped humans, it is because the real
focus of this chapter lies elsewhere. The goal of the chapter is to examine how NPS theory bears
on abortion and euthanasia. These procedures seem to incite more public furor than most other
ethical controversies, and so I will devote the bulk of my discussion to them. The marginal cases
involved are human fetuses, humans that are comatose, and humans that have requested to be
euthanized. I begin by discussing fetuses, after which I turn to comatose humans. I then
conclude with a discussion of voluntary euthanasia. This chapter merely demonstrates the
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application of NPS theory to a handful of bioethical issues. By no means do I intend to offer a
comprehensive decision procedure for whatever issues may come the bioethicist’s way.
5.1. FETUSES
The first is that the topic of abortion looms large in politics and provokes great ethical
debate as to the moral status of the human fetus. As McMahan puts it, “the moral and
metaphysical status of human embryos and fetuses is shrouded in darkness.”175 It is beyond
dispute that a human fetus is human organism. It is popularly believed that this clearly
establishes the impermissibility of abortion in all contexts, including cases in which abortion is
performed to resolve life-threatening pregnancies. But the moral quandaries of abortion are
deeper than often supposed. I will now discuss what some of these are in order to motivate the
need for NPS theory.
The claim that abortion is wrong simply because the fetus is a human being is
problematic. Although most would agree that killing human beings is generally wrong, there are
instances in which killing human beings is seen as permissible, such as self-defense and the
defense of others. Capital punishment is another, though more controversial, example. I
mention these not to argue for their allowance, but to illustrate the widespread belief that killing
human beings is not impermissible simply because they are human, and that species membership
may therefore constitute a weaker basis for arguing against abortion than is commonly supposed.
It is often argued that abortion is impermissible because a human fetus is an innocent human
being. The idea here is that while convicted felons and enemy combatants may be among those
who deserve to die due to their conduct, fetuses are not guilty of doing anything, and so killing
them or allowing them to die is unjust. It is true that since fetuses cannot do anything, they
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cannot be guilty of doing something. But it is a mistake to assume that being free of guilt is
equivalent to being innocent. Some entities do lack guilt because they are innocent, but others
lack guilt because they are not the sort of entities to which the concepts of guilt and innocence
apply. A rock is an example of this sort of entity. Rocks possess neither guilt nor innocence.
And because fetuses lack not just autonomy, but also the sentience required for them to engage
in any level of practical reasoning, it is arguable that they too fall into the same category of
being. This does not mean, of course, that the moral status of a fetus is equivalent to that of a
rock, and it would be ridiculous to think so. It does suggest that the moral status of human
fetuses is, indeed, “shrouded in darkness”176, and that a theoretical framework is needed to better
illuminate the complexities of the issue. NPS theory offers such a framework. According to
NPS theory, there are at least some situations in which abortion is permissible, depending on
whether the fetus is protected by an end duty. According to NPS theory, there are at least some
situations in which abortion is permissible, depending on whether the fetus is a person and is
therefore protected by an end duty. In what follows, I show that the conception of personhood
advanced by NPS theory offers a stronger defense of the permissibility of abortion than those
proposed by other more well-known and famously defended accounts.
No analysis of the ethics of abortion is complete without a discussion of Judith Jarvis
Thomson’s violinist argument where she claims there is at least one circumstance under which
abortion is morally permissible even if the fetus is a person. Although Thomson states she has
granted the assumption that the fetus is a person for the sake of argument, she herself thinks that
the fetus is a person. She says, for instance, that “I am inclined to think also that we shall
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probably have to agree that the fetus has already become a human person well before birth.”177
Thomson describes her argument with an analogy wherein someone has been kidnapped and
hooked up to a famous violinist for the use of their kidneys over a nine-month period so that the
violinist will not die from kidney disease. Being disconnected any earlier means the violinist
will die.178 Thomson argues that while the violinist is a person and therefore has a right to life,
this does not imply that he has a right to use your body against your will, even if that is the only
way for him to stay alive. In this situation, your right to bodily autonomy outweighs the
violinist’s right to life. With the kidnapped victim representing a woman who has become
pregnant through being raped and the violinist representing the fetus, the conclusion of
Thomson’s argument is that abortion is permissible with regard to pregnancies that are
involuntary.
Is Thomson’s argument convincing? There are many who do not think so, as she herself
admits. Thomson points out there are people who believe that pregnancy through rape presents
no exception to abortion’s impermissibility. Such people typically object to abortion by arguing
that the fetus is an innocent human being with a right to life, that directly killing an innocent
human being is murder, and that abortion is therefore always wrong. Thomson counters that
aborting a fetus does not constitute murder if doing so is the only way to save the mother’s life.
She expresses her incredulousness that anyone would deny her on this point: “But it cannot be
seriously be thought to be murder if the mother performs an abortion on herself to save her
life.”179 She also writes, “If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder,
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you do not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug yourself from
that violinist to save your life.”180 Thomson then abruptly ends her discussion of the violinist
analogy, as if she feels that what she has just said is self-evidently true and requires no further
debate. While I and undoubtedly many others agree with her, it is not implausible for someone
to continue to insist that abortion is always impermissible if the fetus is a person that enjoys a
right to life. Christopher Kaczor, for example, launches what he calls the “bodily integrity
objection” against Thomson’s violinist analogy as described below:
The bodily integrity objection begins with the premise that persons have the right
not to have their bodies used by others. This premise is sometimes used as
another way to defend abortion…But if we follow Thomson, holding that the
unborn child is akin to the violinist, then this premise also entails that the human
fetus has a right not to have her body used in order to keep someone else alive (or
a fortiori for any lesser purpose). But in abortion, at least as characteristically
performed, the bodily integrity of the unborn child is violated…If the “right to
control your own body” means anything, it means that no one can dismember a
person without that person’s consent.181
The argument behind the bodily integrity objection is that it is wrong to kill a person that has a
right to life, and because the fetus is a person, it is therefore wrong to abort fetuses. Kaczor
rejects Thomson’s intuition that there are instances in which abortion is permissible in spite of
the fact that the fetus is a person and has a right to life. His objection illustrates that simply
proclaiming that abortion is permissible in cases of rape does not suffice as an argument in
support of abortion.
This is where NPS theory presents an advantage over Thomson with regard to producing
a successful pro-abortion argument. NPS theory manages to avoid Kaczor’s criticism by
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denying that the fetus is a person, thereby denying that the fetus is a subject of a right-to-life.
Recall from earlier in chapter three that the realization of ends-in-view requires an organism to
consciously interact with its wider environment in order to encounter problems and seek
solutions to these problems. It follows that the fetus, which does not yet exist in an environment
where it can consciously experience and seek solutions to problems, is not such an organism.
Because a fetus does not form ends-in-view, it does not exist as a temporally extended entity. A
fetus is therefore not a person, and is thus not a subject of a right-to-life as Thomson and Kaczor
understand it.
NPS theory also holds an advantage over Mary Anne Warren’s pro-abortion argument, as
I will proceed to show. For Warren, the permissibility of abortion is determined by whether or
not fetuses are members of the moral community in which every member carries a moral status
that makes killing it morally wrong. To be a member of the moral community is to enjoy a rightto-life. Warren argues that the moral community should not be restricted to human beings, but to
persons. She writes,
Can it be established that genetic humanity is sufficient for moral community? I
think that there are very good reasons for not defining the moral community in
this way. I would like to suggest an alternative way of defining the moral
community, which I will argue for only to the extent of explaining why it is, or
should be, self-evident. The suggestion is simply that the moral community
consists of all and only people, rather than all and only human beings…(original
emphasis).182
She then provides a list of psychological criteria for defining personhood, which are as follows:
1. “Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in
particular the capacity to feel pain;”183
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2. “Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems);”184
3. “Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either or direct
external control;”185
4. “The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of
types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely
many possible topics;”186
5. “The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or
both.”187
According to Warren, an entity does not need to exhibit any one attribute or combination of
attributes to be considered a person. She does say, however, that an entity that possesses none of
these attributes is not a person; “All we need to claim, to demonstrate that a fetus is not a person,
is that any being which satisfies none of (1)-(5) is certainly not a person.”188 Warren goes on to
argue that abortion is permissible on the grounds that a human fetus satisfies none of the five
criteria.
Don Marquis raises two objections to Warren’s definition of personhood. First, Warren’s
account seems to justify the permissibility of killing newborn infants because the psychological
differences between a fetus and a newborn infant are so minimal that newborn infants fail to
satisfy enough of the criteria to be classified as a person.189 Marquis acknowledges that Warren
addresses this issue in a postscript attached to her original 1973 article wherein she argues that
newborn infants, unlike fetuses, can be adopted, and that there are people who would love and
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provide for them even if the mother does not do so. Marquis points out though that this seems to
suggest that it is impermissible to kill infants only if they are valued by society, and he thinks
this is wrong.190 The infanticide of newborn infants, then, presents a problem for Warren’s
account. The second objection Marquis has is that since an entity, according to Warren’s
account, must exhibit at least one psychological attribute, such as being conscious, in order to
exist as a person, it follows that temporarily unconscious human beings fail to qualify as persons:
“It also seems to entail, because being a person involves exhibiting certain psychological traits,
that killing someone who is temporarily unconscious is morally permissible.”191
Marquis then notes that Warren has two options, neither of which he thinks Warren
would find satisfactory. Option one would be to define a person as an entity that has the
potential to exhibit the required psychological attributes in the future.192 Marquis believes
Warren would reject this option because while it would protect temporarily unconscious human
beings, it would also include fetuses, and this would make abortion impermissible. Option two
would be to define a person as an entity that either actually exhibits certain psychological traits
or is capable of manifesting these traits in the present.193 Marquis points out that although this
option makes abortion permissible, it also makes the killing of temporally unconscious humans
permissible as well, and it would not be in Warren’s interests to embrace this option either.
Marquis thus presents Warren with the horns of a dilemma. On one side lies the option of
defining personhood in such a way as to make abortion and the killing of temporally unconscious
humans permissible. On the other is the option of defining personhood in such a way as to
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making both abortion and the killing of unconscious persons impermissible. Marquis wants to
show that Warren’s desired outcome, that of making abortion permissible and the killing of
temporarily unconscious humans impermissible, cannot be obtained. While Warren’s account of
personhood may not be able to obtain this outcome, the conception of personhood advanced by
NPS theory can. It can also avoid Marquis’s infanticide objection as well.
NPS theory holds that a person is a temporally extended event that begins when an
organism forms and pursues ends-in-view. Until an organism forms and pursues ends-in-view, a
person does not exist. I noted earlier that an organism forms and pursues ends-in-view only
when its interaction with its environment provides it with the opportunity to encounter
problematic situations and to reflect upon them in order to seek solutions. I said that this shows
that fetuses are not persons, since their pre-natal existence renders them unable to do these
things. Newborn infants, however, immediately begin consciously interacting with their
environment at birth. The environment a newborn infant is immersed in enables the infant to
form ends-in-view and to begin existing as a person. So, while neither fetuses nor newborn
infants are persons according to Warren’s account, thereby leaving her account vulnerable to
Marquis’s charge that infanticide of newborn infants is justified, NPS theory holds that fetuses
are not persons and newborn infants are. NPS theory is therefore able to justify the
permissibility of abortion while avoiding Marquis’s infanticide charge. The conception of
personhood advanced by NPS theory not only accounts for the impermissibility of killing
newborn infants, but also that of temporarily comatose human beings. Humans that fall asleep or
become temporarily comatose are persons, according to NPS theory, because they were
consciously awake at some point of time in the past. Because they were consciously awake and
pursued ends-in-view at some point in the past, they exist as the temporally extended entities that
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NPS theory considers as persons. So even though temporarily unconscious humans are not
awake and are presently not forming ends-in-view, they are nonetheless still persons. I discuss
NPS theory and unconscious humans in section 5.2, but for now it is important to acknowledge
the conclusion, namely that NPS theory manages to avoid Marquis’s infanticide objection, as
well as his dilemma that aimed to show an inconsistency between justifying abortion prohibiting
the killing of temporarily unconscious humans. This shows that the conception of personhood
advanced by NPS theory more successfully defends abortion than does Warren’s account of
personhood.
The conception of personhood held by NPS theory also manages to avoid Marquis’s
criticisms of Michael Tooley’s defense of abortion. Tooley advances a conception of
personhood that Marquis refers to as the “desire account.”194 According to the desire account, an
entity is a person if and only if that entity possesses a right to life, and an entity possesses a right
to life only if it desires to live, which Tooley notes is possible only if the entity has a concept of
itself as a continuing subject of experience. As Tooley himself succinctly describes it,
To sum up, my argument has been that having a right to life presupposes that one
is capable of desiring to continue existing as a subject of experiences and other
mental states. This in turn presupposes both that one has the concept of such a
continuing entity and that one believes that one is oneself such an entity. So an
entity that lacks such a consciousness of itself as a continuing subject of mental
states does not have a right to life.195
Tooley then proceeds to argue that since a fetus does not have a conception of itself as a
continuing subject of experiences, it does not desire to live and therefore lacks possession of a
right to life. Thus, he concludes, abortion is permissible. Marquis points out that if Tooley’s
desire account is correct, it would be permissible for persons to kill themselves if they no longer
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desired to continue living, and that it would be permissible to kill unconscious humans as well,
since they do not desire to go on living:
Consider the case of an individual suffering from depression who says that she
wishes she were dead, or, for that matter, who says sincerely that she sees no
point is living. Consider the case of someone who is not a self-conscious being
because she is temporarily unconscious and therefore not conscious of anything,
including her own self. Consider the case of an individual who ‘may permit
someone to kill him because he had been convinced that if he allows himself to be
sacrificed to the gods he will be gloriously rewarded in a life to come’.
Apparently Tooley’s account of the wrongness of killing implies that it is morally
permissible to kill all of the above individuals. It is not. Thus, Tooley’s account,
like Warren’s personhood account, permits too much killing.196
Marquis notes that Tooley himself thought these problems were sufficiently severe to abandon
the desire account altogether: “Tooley’s problem was finding qualifications that rescue the desire
account, that do not seem to be merely ad hoc, and that preserve abortion choice. Because of
these difficulties Tooley eventually gave up his desire account.”197
How NPS theory handles the problem presented by unconscious humans is discussed in
section 5.2, as I noted earlier, but as far as the issue of suicide is concerned, I have already
shown in chapter three that NPS theory forbids killing oneself. As one recalls the argument from
that chapter, any entity that forms ends-in-view values their growth as an end-in-itself. And
because an entity’s state of being alive is necessarily instrumental to the realization of any endin-view, an entity that forms ends-in-view values itself as an end-in-itself as well. This imposes
an end duty against killing an entity that forms ends-in-view, a duty that all entities, including
those that are contemplating suicide, are bound by.198
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I have shown thus far that the conception of personhood advanced by NPS theory offers a
defense of the permissibility of abortion that overcomes objections to the permissibility
arguments of Thomson, Warren, and Tooley. The success of my account stems from denying
that human fetuses are persons. A fetus is not a person because it has never valued itself as an
end-in-itself because it has never interacted with an environment that provides the opportunity to
form ends-in-view in response to problematic situations.
One might object that even though a fetus does not value itself as an end, aborting it is
nonetheless prohibited by an end duty due to the fetus’s potential to possess the capacity to form
ends-in-view. Even though there is no end duty against aborting a fetus that is not already
valued as an end in itself, can it be argued that its potential to value itself as an end implies that
our behavior toward it is constrained as if it is protected by an end duty, and that aborting is
prohibited after all? To answer this question, one must first understand what it means for
something to have the potential to be something else, and what this implies about the moral
status of things. According to McMahan, there are two types of morally relevant potential:
identity preserving potential and non-identity preserving potential. He describes the concept of
identity-preserving potential as follows:
There is a sense in which X has the potential to become Y only if X and Y would
be identical – that is, only if X and Y would be one and the same individual
entity. Or, rather, since what an individual has the potential to become is
normally a thing of a certain sort, perhaps we should say that X has the potential
to become a Y in this first sense only if X will continue to exist as a Y. It is in
this sense that Prince Charles has the potential to become the king of England,
since he would continue to exist as the same individual. I will call this kind of
potential identity-preserving potential. (original emphasis)199
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McMahan contrasts identity-preserving potential with non-identity potential whereby an entity
ceases to exist as the kind of thing it currently is once it realizes its potential to be something
else. He writes,
Identity-preserving potential contrasts with what I will call nonidentity potential.
Nonidentity potential may take a variety of forms, which are unified by two
features: first, when X has the nonidentity potential to become Y (or a Y), Y will
not, when it exists, be identical with X (or Y will not just be a phase in the history
of X); but, second, we nevertheless employ the idiom of “becoming” in describing
the transition from X to Y. In the commonest case, when X has the nonidentity
potential to become Y, X gives rise to, or causally contributes to the production of
Y when its constituent matter is transformed in such a way that, while X itself
ceases to exist, a new and different individual, Y, is formed out of that same
matter. We say, for example, that the sperm and egg together have the potential
to become a zygote. This is a paradigm of nonidentity potential, for when the
sperm and egg fuse, they both cease to exist but the zygote is created out of the
matter of which they were composed (original emphasis).200
McMahan goes on to say that an entity’s potential to become something else gives the entity a
certain moral status only if the entity’s potential to be something else preserves the identity of
what it is now:
The idea that the potential to become a person confers a special moral status is
plausible, if at all, only if the potential is identity-preserving. [It makes little
sense to suppose that X’s potential to become a Y confers a special status on X
now if X will never actually be a Y, and especially if the transition to Y involves
X’s ceasing to exist. In these conditions, if X had a high moral status, that might
be a reason to prevent the realization of its potential, thereby preventing its
ceasing to exist.] (original emphasis)201
The significance of McMahan’s distinction between identity-preserving and non-identitypreserving potential points to how a fetus lacking the capacity to form ends-in-view cannot
transform into something that does possess the capacity and remain a fetus. Even though a fetus
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has the potential to exist as a being with the capacity to form ends-in-view and to thereby value
itself as an end, this potential is non-identity preserving. So while a fetus does have the potential
to value itself as an end, this potential to do so is non-identity preserving. This implies that the
fetus’s potential to value itself as an end is not protected by an end duty. And because the fetus’s
potential to exist as an entity that values itself as an end is non-identity preserving, prohibiting
the fetus’s abortion is not justified on the basis that the fetus should be treated as if it values itself
as an end. The potentiality idea fails as a strategy for justifying end duties against abortion.
Now consider the following scenario as an illustration of the application of NPS theory to the
issue of abortion.
Suppose Lisa is pregnant and suffers from a condition that will kill her unless her fetus is
removed. Removing the fetus will inexorably result in its death. Lisa’s life-threatening
pregnancy presents her with a problematic situation. Remember from chapter three that an
agent’s idea of an end that they think will resolve their problem counts as an end-in-view only if
their problem is resolvable. The fact that aborting Lisa’s fetus can save her life indicates that
Lisa’s problematic situation is resolvable, and that her idea of aborting the fetus counts as an
end-in-view. It is therefore clear that Lisa does possess the capacity to form ends-in-view.
Because Lisa does not want to die, and she feels that securing the life of the fetus, she consents
to the abortion. Since Lisa’s fetus does not form ends-in-view, it does not value itself as an endin-itself, and there is no end duty against aborting it. Now suppose that the situation draws the
attention of Annie, a co-worker of Lisa’s who strongly believes that aborting Lisa’s fetus is
impermissible. It follows from NPS theory that it is not only permissible for Lisa to abort her
fetus, but that it is impermissible to prevent Lisa from doing so. It follows from NPS theory that
it would be wrong for Annie to judge that Lisa should not abort her fetus.

119
One might think that proving this point is unnecessary since Thomson has already argued
that it is permissible for a woman to abort her fetus if it threatens her life. As one recalls,
however, Kaczor’s objection serves to illustrate that someone may continue to insist that abortion
is always impermissible if the fetus is a person and enjoys a right to life. It should not be
assumed that everyone finds Thomson’s argument to be convincing. This is why it is important
to further analyze the scenario I have just described. NPS theory holds in this scenario that not
only is it permissible to abort Lisa’s fetus, but that Annie is not justified in thinking that Lisa’s
fetus should be kept alive. Here is why: Because Annie knows that Lisa has the capacity to form
ends-in-view, she has judged that it is not worth preventing Lisa’s capacity to form ends-in-view
form being destroyed.
As I argued in chapter three202, there is no other basis on which Annie’s judgment can be
justified because making that judgment entails judging that one’s own capacity to form ends-inview has greater value than someone else’s when there is no difference between them. So in
believing that Lisa’s fetus should be kept alive, Annie has judged that Lisa’s capacity to form
ends-in-view has less moral worth than an entity that does not even value itself as an end-initself. This judgement is inconsistent with holding Lisa to be an entity that is valuable as an endin-itself. It follows from NPS theory that this judgment is unjustifiable.
One might object that Annie hasn’t judged that Lisa’s life has less worth because she
hasn’t consciously thought about the value of Lisa’s life, and therefore has not consciously
thought that it has less worth. This objection fails because an agent does not have to consciously
think that a person’s life is not worth saving in order for the agent to make that judgment. Annie
did not have to have consciously think that Lisa’s capacity to form ends-in-view is not worth
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saving in order for her to judge so. By believing that Lisa’s fetus should be kept alive, Annie has
in fact judged that Lisa’s capacity to form ends-in-view is not worth saving. This is because her
value judgment can be inferred from her behavior and her beliefs. As Francesco Orsi writes, “It
is also important to keep in mind that evaluation need not be articulated via value terms, or
indeed be verbally articulated at all. Often we can tell a person’s values and commitments from
her behavior and emotional reactions much more than from what she says (to others or even to
herself)”.203 Accordingly, even though Annie has not consciously thought that Lisa’s capacity to
form ends-in-view is not worth saving, she has judged that it is not worth saving by believing
that Lisa’s fetus should be kept alive.
One might object that Annie has not judged that Lisa’s capacity to form ends-in-view
isn’t worth saving because Annie does not want Lisa to die, since Lisa’s death is not the intention
behind Annie’s belief that the fetus should be kept alive. This objection fails as can be seen by
the following illustration. Suppose I have bought an expensive rug. My reason for buying the
rug was to acquire it, not to spend a lot of money. However, I would not have bought the rug if I
did not think it was worth the money I was willing to spend. So even though my intention
behind buying the rug was not to spend a lot of money, I have nonetheless judged that the rug
was worth the expense. Likewise, even if Annie’s only reason for objecting to the abortion is to
save Lisa’s fetus, she has nonetheless judged that Lisa’s life is not worth saving. She has judged
that Lisa’s capacity to form ends-in-view is not worth saving even though she does not intend for
Lisa to die. What if Lisa’s pregnancy is not life-threatening, and she still does not value her fetus
as an end-in-itself? Lisa’s fetus in this scenario, as in the previous one, lacks the capacity to
form ends-in-view, and an end duty against aborting it cannot be justified.
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5.2 HUMANS THAT ARE NOT CONSCIOUSLY AWAKE
In this section I determine how NPS theory assesses the moral status of humans that are
not consciously awake, that is, sleeping humans and comatose humans. McMahan does not
include sleeping humans in his list of marginal cases, and it might be thought that there is no
need for him to do so. After all, isn’t it obvious that being asleep does not make it more
permissible to be killed? Perhaps. But since NPS theory holds that there is an end duty against
killing a human that forms ends-in-view, and since humans do not make ends-in-view while they
are asleep, it is interesting to assess the moral status of sleeping persons according to NPS
theory.
Recall from chapter four that a person is a temporally extended event that exists when an
organism begins to form ends-in-view. This implies that the overwhelming majority of sleeping
humans are persons. In fact, the only humans that sleep and are not persons are fetuses, which
lack the capacity to form ends-in-view. All other humans that sleep have made ends-in-view in
their life histories and are therefore persons. I shall hereafter use the terms “sleeping humans”
and “sleeping persons” interchangeably. Now even though sleeping persons are not consciously
awake, they easily react to stimuli that brings them to wakefulness. This indicates that sleeping
persons do possess the capacity to form ends-in-view even though they do not do so while they
are asleep. The fact is, however, that because sleeping persons are not awake, they do not form
ends-in-view, and they therefore do not value themselves as ends-in-themselves. This suggests
that there are no end duties against killing persons that are asleep. The suggestion, however, is
false. This is because all persons sleep in order to ensure that their ends-in-view are realized in
the future. Because I have planned, for example, to go grocery shopping tomorrow, I know that I
need to go to sleep so that I will have enough energy to actually realize my end-in-view of going
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grocery shopping. So even though I may not be forming ends-in-view while I am sleeping, the
fact that I am asleep does not mean I have not formed an end-in-view whose realization I am still
pursuing. It follows from NPS theory, then, that there is no morally relevant difference between
killing a person who is asleep and killing a person who is awake and is actively engaged in
pursuing the realization of an end-in-view, for each person has formed an end-in-view that they
are intending to realize at some point in the future. It does not follow then that sleeping persons
lack protection of an end duty simply because they do not form ends-in-view while they are
asleep.
Comatose humans are also persons, but they are persons that lack the capacity to form
ends-in-view because they are unconscious and cannot be brought to wakefulness by stimuli.
The distinction between identity preserving and non-identity preserving potential also explains
why, according to NPS theory, it is wrong to deliberately end the state of being alive of persons
who are temporarily unconscious. If a coma is known to be temporary, as in the case of a
medically induced coma or one with a positive prognosis, there is reason to think that the person
will regain consciousness and re-acquire the capacity to form ends-in-view. And because a
temporarily comatose person will continue to be a person when they wake up and re-acquire the
capacity to form ends-in-view, their potential to be beings that value themselves as an end is
identity-preserving. Thus, their state of being alive is accorded the same protection as a person
who actually does possess the capacity to form ends-in-view.
Comatose humans are not accorded this protection, however, merely because their
potential to be entities that form ends-in-view is identity preserving. Identity preserving
potential is a merely necessary, but not sufficient condition, for granting an entity the same kind
of moral status as the thing that it has the potential to become. In other words, it is the case that
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if x has the same moral status as y, then x’s potential to be a y is identity preserving, but it is not
the case that if x has the identity preserving potential to be a y, then x has the moral status of y.
This can be demonstrated by using McMahan’s illustration of Prince Charles, given in 5.1.
Prince Charles does not currently enjoy the rights and privileges of being king even though his
potential to be king is identity-preserving. This raises the question as to what else is needed, in
addition to identity-preserving potential, for x to enjoy the same moral status as y. The answer is
that x enjoys the same moral status as y if and only if x’s potential to be y is identity-preserving,
and that x used to be a y at some point of time in the past. Accordingly, permanently comatose
persons lack the protection granted by an end duty unless they are valued as ends-in-themselves
by a different party. Although it is true they have formed ends-in-view in the past, permanently
comatose persons lack the potential to regain consciousness, and so they lack the identitypreserving potential to value themselves as ends. Euthanizing a permanently comatose person
would thus not be prohibited by an end duty if he is not valued as an end by a different party.
5.3 VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
Before discussing the morality of euthanasia, it needs to be understood what is meant by
the term and the context in which it is applied. Tooley gives the following definition of
euthanasia simpliciter:
Euthanasia may be defined as an action in which a person is intentionally killed or
allowed to die because it is believed that the individual would be better off dead
than alive – or else, in the case of irreversible coma, at least no worse off.204
Note that euthanasia so defined can present itself as an ethical dilemma in contexts unrelated to
professional medicine and healthcare. If I encounter someone who is slowly being burned alive
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in a car wreck, for example, then the question arises as to whether it would be right for me to put
them out of their misery by ending their life. The setting of this scenario is not a hospital
patient’s bedside, but in popular imagination the image most closely associated with euthanasia
is that of a doctor “pulling the plug” on someone who presents as a case of medical futility.
Therefore, I will limit my discussion of euthanasia to the hospital/medical context as the surest
way of maximizing its value. After defining euthanasia simpliciter, Tooley goes on to describe
voluntary euthanasia as euthanasia that “is requested by the person who undergoes it.”205 This is
how the concept of voluntary euthanasia will be understood in my discussion. The request to be
euthanized is often made by patients because they want to stop experiencing extreme levels of
pain, and the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia is determined in part according to the
intensity of pain on a case-by-case basis. This is how the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia
is determined by NPS theory. The purpose of this section is to discuss the type of pain that
qualifies the administration of voluntary euthanasia as a morally permissible course of action.
The sensation of pain can present itself as a problematic situation. The pain of falling
down, for example, can prevent the runner from finishing the race, and the pain of a headache
can interrupt the writer’s thought process. But the runner can bandage himself and eventually
resume running, and the writer can take aspirin and resume work on her novel. Wearing
bandages and taking aspirin therefore count as ends-in-view because they are responses to
problematic situations that are resolvable. By forming their ends-in-view, the runner and the
writer value themselves as ends, and this in turn justifies end duties against killing them or
letting them die. But the situation is different for someone in a state of UMP. UMP stands for
pain that is unbearable and unmanageable, and I will hereafter use the expression “UMP person”
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to refer to someone in a state of UMP. UMP presents an irresolvable problematic situation to the
UMP person for two reasons. The first is that UMP is unmanageable. This means the sensation
of pain an UMP person experiences cannot be eliminated nor reduced to a less severe level of
intensity. In other words, an UMP person will always experience UMP if they are alive. The
second reason why UMP presents an irresolvable problem is that UMP is unbearable. I presume
that an unmanageable pain can present a resolvable problem to its experiencer if it is bearable
and the person experiencing it could thereby become accustomed to its intensity. I would think,
however, that this is feasible only if the pain is not overwhelming. However, if the pain’s
intensity level is overwhelming, as is the case with UMP, then the possibility of a person
becoming inured to the pain does not exist. Now since the idea of an end is an end-in-view only
if the idea is formed in response to a problematic situation that is resolvable, and since UMP
presents an irresolvable problematic situation, it follows that an UMP person lacks the capacity
to form ends-in-view.
Does this mean that an UMP person lacks the capacity to form ends-in-view altogether?
An UMP person could face a resolvable situation in addition to the irresolvable situation
presented by UMP, and it might then be thought that in this instance an UMP person does in fact
possess the capacity to form ends-in-view, in which case euthanizing them would be prohibited
by an end duty. However, since the experience of UMP is unimaginably painful to an UMP
person, it is doubtful that an UMP person would even be aware of any additional problematic
situations they might be facing. Hence, it is doubtful that an UMP person can form ends-in-view
in response to them. The UMP person’s inability to form an end-in-view in response to the
problematic situation presented by UMP implies that they lack the inability to form any end-inview whatsoever, and an UMP person therefore lacks the capacity to form ends-in-view.
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Now since UMP persons lack the capacity to form ends-in-view, UMP persons cannot
value themselves as ends in themselves. Even if valuing oneself as an end does not require one
to form ends-in-view, the unbearable intensity of experiencing UMP makes it doubtful that UMP
persons can value themselves as ends because it is likely that they cannot desire anything other
than ending their UMP, even if they realize that the only way to do so is to die. Accordingly, if a
person in pain expresses a desire that they do not want to die, then that constitutes a sufficient
reason to believe that their pain is not of UMP quality, and that they can form ends-in-view. It
follows from NPS theory, then, that there is an end duty against killing persons who are in pain
but request to not be killed. But what if someone is in terrible pain and has not requested to not
be killed? In this situation, killing is impermissible only if the pain is of UMP quality. This is
because if a person is in UMP, the they cannot form ends-in-view.
Another objection could be raised against the claim that euthanizing an UMP person is
not prohibited by an end duty. One might try to argue that the UMP person’s request to be
euthanized constitutes an end-in-view. If that were to be true, the line of thinking might be that
the UMP person would value themselves as an end by making the request, and granting the
request would thereby be prohibited by an end duty. It is not difficult to see why one might be
enticed to argue that the UMP person’s request to be euthanized constitutes an end-in-view.
Since one can cease experiencing any type of pain by being euthanized, it might be inferred that
the UMP person’s experience of UMP presents a resolvable, rather than an irresolvable,
problematic situation. This inference would imply that the UMP person’s idea of an end is, in
fact, an end-in-view. This line of reasoning, however, is incorrect. It is indeed true that
euthanizing an UMP person succeeds in eliminating that person’s pain. It is not true that
euthanizing an UMP person will resolve the problematic situation that the UMP person’s
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experience of UMP presents. This is because a problematic situation, as one recalls, is
resolvable only if it is possible to transform it into a situation that is consummatory. One’s
problematic situation is transformed into a consummatory situation only if realizing one’s endin-view succeeds in enabling one to resume one’s pre-interrupted activity. A euthanized person,
however, cannot resume their pre-interrupted activity because a person, once euthanized, is dead.
Thus, while an UMP person’s request to be euthanized is an idea they have of an end that will
eliminate their pain, this idea is not an end-in-view because their problematic situation is
irresolvable. Accordingly, the UMP person does not value themselves as an end by requesting to
be euthanized, and euthanizing an UMP person is not prohibited by an end duty.
Since one cannot value an UMP person as an end in themselves and believe they should
be kept alive, does valuing an UMP person as an end in themselves imply believing that there is
an end duty against keeping them alive? The honest answer to this question is yes. The answer
sounds paradoxical because valuing anything as an end in itself entails adopting an attitude of
respect toward that thing. It is typically assumed that respecting a thing involves believing that
that thing should not be destroyed and that it should continue to exist. According to NPS theory,
however, persons do continue to exist after they die because, as I argued in chapter four, NPS
theory is committed to the thesis that persons are temporally extended events. As a temporally
extended event, a person has parts that are extended across time, and for a person to die is only
for a single part of that person to undergo change. The remaining parts stay the same as they
were when the person was still alive. This is why a person, according to NPS theory, does not
cease to exist upon the moment of their death. Of course, one might object that even if causing a
person’s death does not destroy them, it is still somehow contrary to treating them with the
respect implied in valuing them as an end in themselves. If the belief that one can cause
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someone else’s death while still respecting them strikes one as counterintuitive, then it is only
because the overwhelming majority of persons who are alive do not want to die. I suggested
earlier in this section, however, that UMP persons represent an exception: if a person is in a state
of UMP, then it is likely that they desire to end their life. And since an UMP person does not
value themselves as an end-in-itself, there is no end duty that prohibits ending their life.
5.4 OTHER THOUGHTS
This concludes my discussion about the application of NPS theory and marginal cases. I
argued that human fetuses lack the capacity to form ends-in-view and therefore do not value
themselves as ends. I also claimed that temporarily comatose humans and humans that are
asleep are persons who are protected by end duties. Lastly, I showed that NPS theory supports
voluntary euthanasia.
These are of course not the only applications of NPS theory to marginal cases. However,
as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, I chose to focus my discussion on how NPS theory
bears on abortion and euthanasia because these two particular issues are among the most
inflammatory in the debate over the moral status of humans.
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CONCLUSION

The goal of my dissertation has been twofold. The first goal was to develop an account
of personhood with an eye toward explaining how persons are morally valuable. This account is
called the theory of normative selfhood, or NPS theory. The second goal was to demonstrate the
applicability of NPS theory by assessing its impact on ethical controversies involving marginal
cases. I accomplished these goals over the course of five chapters.
In chapter one, I argued against the concept of intrinsic value. This prepared the stage for
later arguing that the value of persons is extrinsic yet objective. Chapter two expounded on
Dewey’s concept of value and revealed its connection to his account of practical reasoning.
The purpose of chapter three was to show how this account can be used to argue for the
claim that persons are extrinsically yet objectively valuable. The argument here was that persons
possess this type of value by possessing the capacity to form ends-in-view: because no person
can form an end-in-view without having the intention of realizing it, every person must value the
realization of any end-in-view they form as an end in itself. This implies that every person, in
order to form any end-in-view, must value their capacity to form ends-in-view as an end in itself.
This implies that the value of growth is objective. Accordingly, because every person’s state of
being alive (SOBA) is necessarily instrumental to their capacity to form ends-in-view, and every
person that makes ends-in-view must value their capacity to do so as an end in itself, it follows
that every person must value the fact that they exist in SOBA as an end in itself. Therefore,
every person, by virtue of possessing the capacity to form ends-in-view, is extrinsically and
objectively valuable. I discussed the normative constraints this argument imposes on what
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persons may do to themselves and to others. In doing so, I acknowledged my debt to Kant’s
formula of humanity while describing the ways in which NPS theory departs from it.
Chapter four was devoted to explicating the metaphysical structure of personhood that
NPS theory implies. I argued that persons are temporally extended events because they begin to
exist by forming ends-in-view. The specific content of an end-in-view is determined by the
problematic situation to which it was developed in reaction, and a problematic situation exists
objectively as the outcome of a causally continuous sequence of events that extends backwards
into the past. I showed that this account of personal ontology conforms well to common-sense
intuitions regarding personhood, and that it is also consistent with Dewey’s own remarks about
personhood.
In the fifth and final chapter I demonstrated the applicability of NPS theory by assessing
its impact on ethical controversies centered on marginal cases. I focused mainly on the issues of
abortion and euthanasia because these are the issues that provoke more public discussion than
most other ethical controversies. I argued that fetuses lack the moral protection that accorded to
persons who are valued as ends in themselves because a fetus’s potential to be a person is nonidentity preserving. Although temporarily comatose humans lack the capacity to form ends-inview, they merit the level of protection accorded to persons that value themselves as ends-inthemselves because a temporally comatose human has the identity preserving potential to be a
person that values themselves as ends in themselves. Because a permanently comatose person
lacks any potential to be a person that possesses the capacity to form ends-in-view, they lack the
protection accorded to persons who value themselves as ends in themselves. I concluded the
chapter by discussing the instances in which NPS theory justifies voluntary euthanasia.
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I end this dissertation with the final thought that although NPS theory presents a
conception of the value of life to be used in arguments about bioethics, it is not meant to provide
definitive answers to the complicated issues regarding marginal cases. Rather, I offer it as a
means of contributing to these controversial conversations from an ethical perspective so that
conflicting values and moral questions can be identified and discussed.
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